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BIOPOLITICS AND REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE: FERTILITY POLICIES BETWEEN
WOMEN’S  RIGHTS AND STATE AND COMMUNITY INTERESTS
GILA STOPLER1
In this Article, I argue that the liberal assumption that governments must not engage in
biopolitics by setting fertility policies is flawed in both theory and practice. It is flawed in theory
because  government  must  take  reproduction  into  account  in  order  to  ensure  individual  women’s  
rights to liberty and equality and to guarantee reproductive justice. It is flawed in practice since
all governments set policies that directly and indirectly affect fertility, even if they do not name
them fertility policies. Nevertheless, past and present experience have taught us that fertility
policies set by states and communities to respond to their population needs have more often than
not ignored the rights of the women recruited to carry them through. States have used women as a
means to an end rather than as an end in themselves.
In order to resolve this dilemma, I offer a test for assessing the legitimacy of fertility
policies. In this Article, I identify three types of interests that fertility policies may serve:
legitimate state and community interests, individual liberty interests, and individual equality
interests. The validity of a given fertility policy should be assessed by examining it against these
interests, and two rules should guide this examination. First, fertility policies should only be
based  on  a  state’s  need  to  promote  legitimate  interests  (the  “legitimate  interests  prong”).  Second,
due to the primacy of individual rights, even legitimate state and group interests in fertility can
only  be  realized  while  respecting  and  promoting  individual  rights,  especially  individual  women’s  
rights,   to   both   liberty   and   equality   (the   “liberty   and   equality   prong”).   I   will   then   discuss   and  
examine various fertility policies from around the world, including the United States, in light of
the suggested test.
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INTRODUCTION
“I   cannot   imagine   anything   more   emphatically   a   subject   that   is   not   a   proper  
political or governmental activity or function or responsibility. . . . This
government . . . will not . . . as long as I am here, have a positive political
doctrine  in  its  program  that  has  to  do  with  the  problem  of  birth  control.  That’s  
not  our  business.”
President Dwight Eisenhower, December 19592
“More   state  abortion  restrictions   were  enacted  in  2011-2013 than in the entire
previous  decade.”  
Guttmacher Institute3
The United States fertility rate dropped in 2012 to a record low of 1.88 children per
woman.4 This rate is below  the  replacement  level  of  2.1  children  per  woman,  which  is  “the  level  
at  which  a  given  generation  can  exactly  replace  itself.” 5 The U.S. fertility rate has been below the

2

President Dwight Eisenhower, Transcript of the President’s  News  Conference  on  Foreign  and  Domestic  
Matters, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1959, at 18.
3
News in Context: More State Abortion Restrictions Were Enacted in 2011-2013 Than in the Entire
Previous Decade, GUTTMACHER INST. (Jan. 2, 2014), https://guttmacher.org/media/inthenews/2014/01/02/index.html
(summarizing findings of Elizabeth Nash et al., Laws Affecting Reproductive Health and Rights: 2013 State Policy Review,
GUTTMACHER INST., http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/updates/2013/statetrends42013.html (last visited Mar. 28,
2015)).
4

Joyce A. Martin et al., Births: Final Data for 2012, 62 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP., no. 9, 2013, at 1, 7
(noting  the  decline  of  the  total  fertility  rate  in  the  United  States  to  “1,880.5  births  per  1,000  women”  in  2012).
5

Id. at 7.
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recommended replacement level since 1971.6 Nevertheless, no official government policy has
been crafted to try to reverse this trend. A major reason for this omission may be the prevailing
U.S. perception that national governments have no business interfering with personal reproductive
choices, as illustrated by President Dwight Eisenhower’s   quote   above.   Eisenhower’s   exact  
sentiments   are   echoed   in   Justice   Brennan’s   famous   words:   “If   the   right   of   privacy   means  
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether
to  bear  or  beget  a  child.”7 Nevertheless,  apparently  unperturbed  by  Eisenhower’s  and  Brennan’s  
concerns, and perhaps in part in order to forestall the demographic decline, states have enacted
more abortion restrictions in 2011 to 2013 than in the entire previous decade. 8
A   similar   approach   to   Eisenhower’s   nonintervention   approach   is   conveyed   in   Michel  
Foucault’s  1976  lecture  series  Society Must Be Defended.9 In his lectures, Foucault describes the
emergence in the second half of the eighteenth century of a new form of state power (biopower)
which  has  given  rise  to  a  new  form  of  state  politics  he  terms  “biopolitics.” 10 Biopolitics seeks to
control the population of the state through the regulation of processes  “such  as  the  ratio  of  births  
to  deaths,  the  rate  of  reproduction,  [and]  the  fertility  of  [the]  population.” 11 Foucault distinguishes
between conventional state power which is focused on the individual and seeks to discipline the
individual body (anatomo-politics), and biopower and biopolitics, whose focus is on the entire
mass of people—the population.12 According to Foucault, in the second half of the eighteenth
century, for the first time in history, the population, as such, is seen as a political, scientific and
biological problem, in which advances in the sciences, such as demography and medicine, allow
the state to regularize and regulate. 13 This is a worrying development for Foucault, who believes
that a liberal state that respects individual rights simply cannot engage with biopolitics or with
problems   of   population,   since   “[h]ow   can   the   phenomenon   of   ‘population,’   with   its   specific  
effects and problems, be taken into account in a system concerned about respect for legal subjects
and individual free enterprise? In the name of what and according to what rules can it be
managed?”14
Foucault’s  concern  is  not  misplaced.  Many  countries  around  the  world,  from  China  and  
Romania to Israel, Japan and the United States, engage in biopolitics to varying degrees and with
6

Id.

7

Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (emphasis omitted).

8

See GUTTMACHER INST., supra note 2. See also U.S. Representative Bob   Goodlatte’s   remarks   during  
discussion of proposed anti-abortion legislation in the House Judiciary Committee, of which he is the chair. Laura Bassett,
GOP   Congressman:   Limiting   Abortion   ‘Promotes   Job   Creation,’ HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 15, 2014, 4:07 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/01/15/bob-goodlatte-abortion-jobs_n_4604169.html.
9

See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, SOCIETY MUST BE DEFENDED: LECTURES AT THE COLLÈGE DE
FRANCE, 1975-76) (Mauro Bertani & Alessandro Fontana eds., David Macey trans., Picador 2003).
10

Id. at 243.

11

Id. In this Article, my interest in biopolitics   is   specifically   focused   on   government’s   influence   on  
reproduction and reproductive rights (and not, for example, on morbidity rates).
12

Id. at 242-43.

13

Id. at 245.

14
MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE BIRTH OF BIOPOLITICS: LECTURES AT THE COLLÈGE DE FRANCE, 1978-79, at
317 (Michel Senellart ed., Graham Burchell trans., Palgrave Macmillan 2008).
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less than full attention to the rights of the individuals affected by their policies. 15 Furthermore, not
only states, but other communities, especially national and religious communities, engage in
biopolitics,   and   contrary   to   Foucault’s   claim   that biopolitics is a new phenomenon, have been
doing so for many generations. 16 The best example of religiously-inspired biopolitics is the
Genesis   proverb   “be   fertile   and   multiply,” 17 which, perhaps because of its religious nature, has
probably been the single most important and influential biopolitical act in the history of the world.
Foucault’s  aversion  to  biopolitics  is  motivated  by  his  conviction  that  biopolitics  cannot,  
under any circumstances, be reconciled with individual rights. However, this Article will claim
that  this  dichotomous  position  is  mistaken  and  can  be  attributed  at  least  in  part  to  Foucault’s  male  
centered understanding of both individual rights and of state power. A known feminist critique of
Foucault’s   writings   on   state   power   and   on   the regulation of sexuality holds that Foucault
completely ignores the unique position of women and the unique impact of the regulation of
sexuality on them in his analyses. For example, Professor Sandra Bartky argues:
Foucault treats the body throughout as if it were one, as if the bodily
experiences of men and women did not differ and as if men and women bore the
same relationship to the characteristic institutions of modern life. Where is the
account   of   the   disciplinary   practices   that   engender   the   “docile   bodies”   of  
women, bodies more docile than the bodies of men? . . . To overlook the forms
of subjection that engender the feminine body is to perpetuate the silence and
powerlessness of those upon whom those disciplines have been imposed.
Hence, even though a  liberatory  note  is  sounded  in  Foucault’s  critique  of  power,  
his analysis as a whole reproduces that sexism which is endemic throughout
Western political theory.18
Bartky’s   critique   is   to   the   point,   but   it   uncovers   only   half   of   Foucault’s   oversight.  
Women’s unique position with respect to the regulation of sexuality works in two seemingly
contradictory ways. On the one hand, as Bartky points out, it makes them more vulnerable to a
violation of their bodily integrity and their basic rights through oppressive regulation. On the
other hand, and at the same time, it also makes them more vulnerable to the absence of regulation.
Thus, feminists have argued that the lack of state regulation and support for matters pertaining to
women’s  unique  reproductive  functions and needs, such as those concerning pregnancy and child
15

On China, see Rachael Savanyu, The   Public   Womb:   Women   under   China’s   One-Child Policy, in
International Watch, 9 BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J. 11, 17-20 (2000-2001). On Romania, see Florin S. Soare, Ceausescu’s  
Population Policy: A Moral or an Economic Choice Between Compulsory and Voluntary Incentivised Motherhood?; 2
EUR. J. GOV. & ECON., 59, 60 (2013). On Israel, see Gila Stopler, Israel’s  Natality  Policy  and  the  Rights  of  Women  and  
Minorities, 11 MISHPAT UMIMSHAL 473 (2008) (Hebrew). On Japan, see Michiko Miyazaki, The History of AbortionRelated Acts and Current Issues in Japan, 26 MED. & L. 791 (2007) (discussing the history of abortion law in Japan). On
the United States, see Lisa Powell, Eugenics and Equality: Does the Constitution Allow Policies Designed to Discourage
Reproduction Among Disfavored Groups?, 20 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 481, 484-85 (2002). See also infra Parts I-IV for a
detailed discussion of policies in the United States and various countries.
16

Paul Demeny, Population Policy in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POPULATION 752, 752-53 (Paul Demeny &
Geoffrey McNicoll eds., 2003)
17

Genesis 1:28.

18
SANDRA LEE BARTKY, FEMININITY AND DOMINATION: STUDIES IN THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF
OPPRESSION 65 (1990).
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birth, prevent women from fully realizing their reproductive rights as well as their other liberal
rights, and from obtaining reproductive justice. 19 Unlike   men’s,   women’s   oppression   can   be  
deepened not   only   by   the   state’s   misuse of its biopower, but also by its disuse of its biopower.
Foucault’s  and  Eisenhower’s   male-centric failure to acknowledge this fact can account for their
insistence that any form of biopolitics is unsuitable for the liberal state.
While the feminist position that I have just stated is quite common in most parts of the
world, other feminists, and especially U.S. feminists, object to any government intervention in
issues concerning fertility and reproduction, due to the tendency of states and communities to
disregard   women’s   rights   when   engaging   in   biopolitics.   To   these   feminists   the   slogan  
“government,  stay  out  of  my  uterus”  has  become  a  rallying  cry. 20 This Article will question both
the feasibility of this rallying cry and the assumption that the full withdrawal of government from
any and all fertility and reproduction issues is indeed in the best interests of women. While fully
acknowledging  that  grave  violations  of  women’s  rights  may  occur  when  governments  engage  in  
biopolitics, and while agreeing that in some respects government should certainly stay out of
women’s  uteruses,  this  Article  will  use  a  feminist  perspective  to  claim  that  women  should  insist  
that in other respects, and under certain conditions, governments must take full cognizance of
their uteruses when crafting public policy, and that by not doing so governments are violating
women’s   equal   rights.   This   position,   which   is   widely   shared   by   feminists   around   the   world,   is  
much less popular in the United States. 21 American exceptionalism in this area can be attributed in
large part to the choice-based legacy of Roe v. Wade and to the continuing feminist struggle to
preserve its precarious gains.22 However, as Professor Robin West eloquently argues, Roe’s  
19

See, e.g., Natasha Bhushan, Note, Work-Family Policy in the United States, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 677,  677,  683  (2012).  “Reproductive  justice”  as  referred  to  in  this  Article  is  the  full  realization  of  both  the  negative  
and the positive rights aspects of  women’s  reproductive  health.  A  commonly  used  definition  of  reproductive  justice  in  the  
United States, which comes from a founding organization in the American reproductive justice grassroots movement and
which excellently captures this meaning, is the following:
[T]he complete physical, mental, spiritual, political, economic, and social well-being of women and
girls [that] will be achieved when women and girls have the economic, social and political power
and resources to make healthy decisions about our bodies, sexuality and reproduction for ourselves,
our families and our communities in all areas of our lives.
ASIAN COMMUNITIES FOR REPROD. JUSTICE, A NEW VISION FOR ADVANCING OUR MOVEMENT FOR REPRODUCTIVE
HEALTH, REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, AND REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE 1 (2005), available at http://strongfamiliesmovement.org/
assets/docs/ACRJ-A-New-Vision.pdf. It is important to note that the grassroots reproductive justice movement in the
United  States  is  critical  of  the  use  of  “rights  talk”  and  of  litigation  strategies to achieve reproductive justice in light of the
skewed understanding of reproductive rights in the United States, which is based on a negative right to privacy. See
Cynthia Soohoo, Hyde-Care for All: The Expansion of Abortion-Funding Restrictions under Health Care Reform, 15
CUNY L. REV. 391, 398-99  (2012).  While  this  Article  shares  the  American  reproductive  justice  movement’s  criticism  of  
the  current  skewed  understanding  of  reproductive  rights  in  American  law,  it  does  not  share  its  aversion  to  “rights  talk”  or  
to the use of courts to monitor government fertility policies.
20

(Jul.
517871980.
POST

See, e.g., FORA.tvPolitics, Rep.  Tammy  Duckworth  Slams  GOP:  ‘Stay  Out  of  My  Uterus,’ HUFFINGTON
28, 2013), http://videos.huffingtonpost.com/rep-tammy-duckworth-slams-gop-stay-out-of-my-uterus-

21

See, e.g., Robin West, From Choice to Reproductive Justice: De-Constitutionalizing Abortion Rights,
118 YALE L.J. 1394 (2009) (discussing how the constitutional right to abortion legitimates a minimalist state response to
women who opt to carry their pregnancies to term and to poor parents who in actuality require more support).
22

Id. at 1398-1405; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-55 (1973).
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continuing vulnerability should not prevent feminists from openly critiquing its problematic
choice-based legacy, and the way in which it has weakened the struggle for reproductive rights
more broadly conceived in the United States.23
Contrary to Foucault, I will claim that there are a host of economic, societal and feminist
reasons why governments may take a deep interest in the size and growth of their populations,
and that therefore governments do have a legitimate interest in engaging in biopolitics, fertility,
and reproduction.24 Thus, the real question is not whether governments should take an interest in
the size and growth of their population, but how can they do so without violating individual
rights,   especially   women’s   rights.   I   will   further   claim   that   as   a   factual   matter all governments,
including the U.S. government, necessarily engage in fertility policies, since there is no
government that does not make an abundance of direct and indirect policy choices that affect
fertility and reproduction.25 In this context, the Article will argue that nonintervention in fertility
is as much a fertility policy as any interventionist fertility policy—and with similarly profound
implications.26
Consequently, the question we need to ask is not whether it is legitimate for a
government to have any fertility policy, but what fertility policies are legitimate for governments
to have? In an attempt to answer this question, the Article will identify three types of interests that
fertility policies may serve: (1) legitimate state and group interests, (2) individual liberty interests,
such as autonomy and privacy, and (3) individual equality interests. The Article will claim that
while communities and states may have a legitimate interest in trying to influence fertility rates,
this interest may only  be  realized  by  promoting  individual  women’s  liberty  and  equality  interests.  
Thus,  the  answer  to  Foucault’s  question,  “[i]n  the  name  of  what  and  according  to  what  rules  can  
[the  phenomenon  of  population]  be  managed?”27 is that population can and should be managed in
the   name   of   women’s   liberty   and   equality   interests   and   according   to   rules   promoting   these  
interests.
In Part I of the Article, I will ask whether states can(not) have fertility policies, and
explore the interests that underlie such policies. I will begin by describing the liberal critique
against any government intervention in reproduction and show how, following Roe, this critique
has become the basis for American liberal feminist thinking on reproductive rights. I will then
move on to discuss the perspective of the state, and flesh out the reasons why states and
communities may have a legitimate interest in fertility policies. Then, building on Professor
Frances  Olsen’s  argument  with  respect  to  the  myth  of  state  nonintervention  in  the  family, I will
claim that it is theoretically incoherent and factually untrue to hold that states may be able to
abstain from making any policy decisions with regard to fertility. If having fertility policies is
both legitimate and inevitable, then the question that needs to be asked is not whether states can
have fertility policies, but what sorts of fertility policies are legitimate for states to have, and what
23

West, supra note 21, at 1404.

24

Demeny, supra note 16, at 753-54. At the international level, see Jason L. Finkle & C. Alison McIntosh,
The New Politics of Population, 20 POPULATION & DEV. REV. (Supp. 1994) 3, 6-7 (1994).
25

In   this   Article,   “fertility   policies”   will   refer   to   any   policy   that   directly   or   indirectly   affects   women’s  
ability  to  give  birth  to  children  and  to  parents’  ability  to raise them.
26

This   argument   follows   Frances   Olsen’s   famous   argument   regarding   the   incoherence   of   arguing   that  
government can have a policy of nonintervention in the family. See Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the
Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 835 (1985).
27

FOUCAULT, BIRTH OF BIOPOLITICS, supra note 14, at 317.
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types of interests can underlie these policies. I will then discuss the feminist perspective on the
types of policies that are legitimate, and indeed required, for a state to have.
Finally, based on this discussion, I will suggest a test for assessing the legitimacy of
fertility policies. I will identify three types of interests that fertility policies may serve: legitimate
state and group interests, individual liberty interests, such as autonomy and privacy, and
individual equality interests, and claim that the validity of a given fertility policy should be
assessed by examining it against these interests. Two rules should guide this examination. First,
similar  to  any  other  government  policy,   fertility  policies  can  only  be  based  on  a   state’s  need  to  
promote   legitimate   interests   (the   “legitimate   interests   prong”).   Second,   due   to   the   primacy   of  
individual rights, even legitimate state and group interests in fertility can only be realized while
respecting  and  promoting  individual  rights,  especially  individual  women’s  rights,  to  both  liberty  
and   equality   (“liberty   and   equality   prong”).   Any   policy   should   satisfy both prongs of the test
concurrently, in order to be considered legitimate.
The reminder of the Article will be dedicated to a discussion of some of the fertility
policies that exist throughout the world, including in the United States, and their evaluation
according to the suggested test. In Part II, I will discuss pronatalist fertility policies and assess
them according to the suggested two-pronged test. In particular I will discuss various restrictions
on abortion, ideological propaganda aimed at encouraging women to have children, and support
for families. In Part III, I will discuss antinatalist policies and their limits. I will also discuss in
detail whether it is legitimate for a state to try to implement antinatalist fertility policies in
traditional communities, where women are pressured into having an inordinately high number of
children. Finally, in Part IV, I will discuss various eugenic fertility policies, in particular
restrictions on interracial and interreligious marriages as eugenic fertility policies.
I. CAN STATES (NOT) HAVE FERTILITY POLICIES?
In   this   section,   I   will   flesh   out   the   various   arguments   for   and   against   states’   rights   to  
design fertility policies. I argue that states may, should, and in fact, do have policies that affect
fertility, and suggest a test for assessing the legitimacy of these policies.
A. The Liberal Approach
Decisions concerning procreation and family planning are among the most intimate and
meaningful life decisions that people make. Consequently, liberal theory holds that the state must
stay out of such decisions.28 Liberal are highly suspicious of government and its motivations. This
28

Gila Stopler, A Feminist Perspective on Natality Policies in Multicultural Societies, 2 L. & ETHICS
HUMAN RTS. 1, 5 (2008). The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized liberty rights, which protect individuals from undue
interference by the state, as including decisions related to: abortion, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973); marriage,
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, at 453-54 (1972) (stating that the right of privacy includes the right of the individual to be free from
governmental intervention into the decision to have children); and the raising and education of children, Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (reviewing previous cases where the Court has deemed a government action
cannot infringe in the area of private family life); Pierce v. Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268
U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding the state cannot force children to only attend public schools). This line of cases which
anchors individual liberty rights in substantive due process is steeped in classical liberal thought. See Davin J. Hall, Not So
Landmark after All? Lawrence v. Texas: Classical Liberalism and Due Process Jurisprudence, 13 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 617, 638 (2004) (discussing  how  the  Supreme  Court’s  decision  in  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), builds
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suspicion leads liberals to adhere to a sharp distinction between the public and the private
sphere.29 While government is allowed to interfere in the public sphere, it must stay out of the
private sphere of home and family, and even more so of intimate relations and procreation
decisions.30 In these spheres the greatest possible freedom must be attained. 31 In the famous words
of Isaiah Berlin:
[T]here are frontiers, not artificially drawn, within which men should be
inviolable, these frontiers being defined in terms of rules so long and widely
accepted that their observance has entered into the very conception of what it is
to be a normal human being . . . .32
Moreover, because autonomy is fundamental to liberal theory, liberals would reject any
attempt by the state to take a stand as to the desired number of children per family or to take
measures to carry this stand into effect, believing that such measures may obstruct the ability of
individuals to freely choose the number of their children. 33In the United States, this strong liberal
stance against any government intervention in reproduction has served as the constitutional basis
for the Supreme  Court’s  most  important  decision  on  reproductive  rights,  Roe v. Wade.34 The Roe
court held that the right to privacy, which is founded on the Fourteenth Amendment concept of
personal  liberty  and  on  restrictions  upon  state  action,  encompasses  a  woman’s  decision whether or
not to terminate her pregnancy. 35 Thus,  the  woman’s  right  to  choose  whether  or  not  to  carry  her  
pregnancy to term is an individualistic, negative right to privacy and personal liberty. As West
points out, the right to abortion established by Roe prohibits the state from interfering in a
woman’s  contractual  freedom  to  purchase  an  abortion,  but  it  does  nothing  to  ensure  that  a  woman  
who needs an abortion can actually have access to one or can afford to pay for it. 36 Furthermore,
even this negative individualistic right not to reproduce is limited. The Court rejected the claim
that a woman has an absolute right to decide when and how to terminate her pregnancy, and held
that the state can restrict that right through regulation protecting important state interests.37
Moreover, Roe did not even explicitly create a legal right to abortion, but only created a right
against the criminalization of abortion in some circumstances and left the abortion decision and its
effectuation to the medical judgment of  the  pregnant  woman’s  physician,  and  not  to  the  woman  
herself.38
on the liberal theory of prior cases).
29

Stopler, supra note 28.

30

Id.

31

Id.

32

Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 15, 28 (Michael J. Sandel ed.,

33

Stopler, supra note 28, at 5-6.

34

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

35

Id. at 153.

36

West, supra note 21, at 1403.

37

Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.

38

West, supra note 21, at 1403; Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-66.
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West argues that, notwithstanding all the limitations of the Roe decision  from  a  women’s  
rights perspective, there have been very few constructive critiques of Roe by feminist legal
scholars.39 She attributes this mainly to Roe’s   continuing   vulnerability,   but   also   to   the   feminist  
belief  in  its  efficacy  and  to  the  feminist  feeling  that  “Roe got  so  much  exactly  right”  even  if  it  did  
not get everything right.40 However, while Roe may   have   “got[ten]   so   much   exactly   right”   in  
terms of protecting the right to abortion, Roe’s   individualistic,   negative,   choice-based
understanding   of   women’s   reproductive   rights   has   been   detrimental   to   the   American   feminist  
understanding of the proper role of the state in   affirmatively   supporting   women’s   reproductive  
rights through appropriate fertility policies, 41 which is further explored in Part I.C.
B. State Interests and State Actions
Every state and every society has a strong interest in fertility rates. Fertility rates can
determine the future of the community—will it grow enough or too much, will it grow smaller or
perhaps even disappear altogether? While, in the past, the size of the population was considered
vital to ensuring national strength, economic growth, and protection from outside aggression, 42
these days the size of the population and its age composition are considered central to issues such
as public spending on elderly care, pensions and health care, and the size of the workforce. 43 All
these issues represent legitimate and important interests which any government is permitted and
indeed expected to care about and to plan for. The fact that these issues are directly affected by
fertility rates makes fertility rates a subject that the government can legitimately be concerned
with when working to advance such interests.
It  is  important  to  stress  that  my  defense  of  the  government’s  right  to  concern  itself  with  
fertility rates is limited only to such instances in which the interests that the government is trying
to promote through its fertility policies are themselves legitimate interests. Thus, if the
government designs fertility policies in order to achieve clearly illegitimate interests, such as
racial purity, these policies should be struck down. 44 Furthermore, even state interests that are not
facially illegitimate should be carefully scrutinized, and found legitimate only when they aim to
achieve societal goals that are appropriate in a democratic society and are sensitive to the need to
respect individual rights.45 Thus,  for  example,  a  societal  goal  of  tripling  a  country’s  fertility  rates  
39

West, supra note 21, at 1398-1405.

40

Id. at 1400-02.

41

Id. at 1425 (arguing that Roe does not create a robust concept of reproductive justice, but instead,
suggests that women have a right to nonreproductive sex).
42

See Finkle & McIntosh, supra note 24, at 3; Demeny, supra note 16, at 752.

43

See Organisation for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OEDC], Policy Brief: Can Policies Boost Birth Rates?,
at 1 (Nov. 2007); see also Comm’n  of  European  Communities,  Green  Paper  “Confronting  Demographic Change: A New
Solidarity Between the Generations,” at 13 COM (2005) 94 final (Mar. 16, 2005).
44

See Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding Balancing: The Role of Exclusionary Reasons in Constitutional Law, 45
HASTINGS L.J. 711,  750  (1994)  (highlighting  “excluded  reasons”  that  cannot  serve  as  justification  for  government  action  
in a certain area of life).
45

See European Convention on Human Rights, art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (previously titled
“Convention  for  the  Protection  of  Human  Rights  and  Fundamental  Freedoms”),  for  a  similar  examination  of  state  interests  
and the right to respect for private and family life. Article 8 states:  “Everyone  has  the  right  to  respect  for  his  private  and  
family life . . . .There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in
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should  not  be   considered  a   legitimate   state  interest,   no   matter  how  dangerously  low  a  country’s  
fertility rate is. The reason is that such a goal, whose achievement would require women to triple
the  number  of  their  children,  is  clearly  insensitive  to  women’s  individual  rights.  Thus,  my  claim  
that governments can design fertility policies to advance legitimate state interests does not mean
that the government can decide on any fertility policy that advances these interests. I would,
however, argue that it does mean that, despite liberal uneasiness about government intrusion into
the private sphere of home and family, governments are justified in trying to craft fertility policies
that may advance important and legitimate interests, as long as these policies are compatible with
individual  rights,  and  especially  with  women’s  rights.  The  exact  contours  of  this  compatibility  are  
discussed in Part I.C below.
Thus far, I have argued that governments may have general legitimate interests to create
fertility policies. In addition, from a feminist perspective, governments have the right, and indeed
the   duty,   to   design   fertility   policies   that   can   advance   women’s   rights   to   liberty   and   equality.
Before turning to the feminist arguments with regard to fertility policies, I first claim that, as a
factual matter, it is impossible for governments not to affect fertility, directly and indirectly,
through their actions and inactions. Thus, my claim is  that  a  decision  such  as  Eisenhower’s—not
to have any policy with regard to fertility—is as much a fertility policy as the decision to craft a
positive   fertility   policy,   and   should   be   regarded   as   such.   This   argument   tracks   Olsen’s   famous  
argument with regard to the myth of state nonintervention in the family. 46 According to Olsen,
with  respect  to  state  involvement  in  the  family  the  terms  “intervention”  and  “nonintervention”  are  
indeterminate and largely meaningless.47 They imply that the state can choose either to remain
neutral or uninvolved in the family (nonintervention), or to take a stand and get involved in the
family (intervention).48 Olsen argues that this way of presenting state involvement in the family is
ideologically driven and analytically mistaken.49 A state cannot stay neutral or remain uninvolved,
since  “[a]s  long  as  a  state  exists  and  enforces  any  laws  at  all,  it  makes  political  choices.” 50 Thus,
the state already intervenes in the family by the very fact that it decides which groupings to
recognize as families and which not, and what rights and duties each member of the family may
have towards the other.51
A similar argument can be made with respect to fertility. Although the biological fact of
giving birth may occur irrespective of the state, almost all other aspects of fertility—from the
legal recognition of motherhood through contraception, abortion, and fertility treatment, to
maternity leave and child care—are regulated by state laws.52 Furthermore, the biological fact of
giving birth is itself influenced by government policies on all the above-mentioned issues. Thus,
for   example,   the   government’s   refusal   to   apply   anti-discrimination in employment laws to
pregnant   women,   or   to   mandate   paid   maternity   leave,   restricts   working   women’s   options   for
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society . . . .”  Id. (emphasis added).
46

See Olsen, supra note 26.

47

Id. at 835.

48

Id. at 835-37

49

Id. at 863.

50

Id. at 836.

51

See id. at 837, 842.

52
See generally Ryiah Lilith, The G.I.F.T of Two Biological and Legal Mothers, 9 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 207 (2001) (discussing the legal recognition of motherhood).
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childbearing.53 Similarly, restrictions on abortion and on the allocation of federal funds to sex
education programs other than abstinence-only  programs,  restricts   women’s  and   girls’  ability   to  
prevent or end an unwanted pregnancy. 54 Thus, government cannot, and in fact does not, remain
neutral with regard to fertility. Any decision that the government makes, or that it refuses to
make,  has  a  clear  impact  on  fertility,  both  in  terms  of  the  individual  woman’s  ability  to  exercise  
her reproductive rights and in terms of aggregate fertility rates.
Arguably, even if government actions and inactions affect fertility whether government
intends for this to happen or not, one could still claim a distinction between intentionally trying to
influence fertility rates and doing so unintentionally. As the argument would go, from the
perspective of respecting privacy and autonomy, what is morally wrong, and should therefore be
prohibited, is the intention to affect fertility rates, not the actual effect.
However, I would argue that the distinction between acting with intent to affect fertility
rates and acting without such intent is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, it would seem rather
naïve to assume that governments are unaware of the effects on fertility rates of most of the
policies they enact. It is very easy for a government that wishes to influence fertility rates to do so
without revealing its intent. Thus, ruling out only intentional fertility policies does not in fact
prevent their existence. For example, Professor Patricia Hill Collins shows how U.S. fertility
policies   (which   she   terms   “population   policies”),   although   allegedly   non-existent, and not
intended to influence fertility rates, are in fact very much in existence and are designed to result in
differentiated fertility rates according to different racial and social classes. 55 She argues that a
complex array of state policies governing taxation, insurance, employment conditions and health
care   regulation   encourage   middle   class   white   women’s   fertility,   while   other policies, including
welfare policies that encourage permanent or reversible sterilization, aim to decrease the fertility
rates of working-class and poor African-American women.56 The second reason why I find the
distinction between acting with intent to affect fertility rates and acting without such intent
unpersuasive   is   that,   as   Collins’s   example   clearly   shows,   not   only   does   ruling   out   intentional  
fertility policies not prevent their existence, but it makes it easier for such policies to exist
undetected and un-scrutinized. The existence of clear, intentional and transparent fertility policies
would make it easier for those influenced by them to identify, scrutinize, and criticize fertility
policies.
If the arguments above are correct, then the question that needs to be asked is not
whether states should have fertility policies, but what kind of fertility policies should states have?
This brings me to the feminist argument regarding the desired design of government fertility
policies to which I now turn.

53

See Bhushan, supra note 19; Jessica Monroe, Ohio’s  “Pregnancy-blind”  Leave  Policy:  The  Public  Policy  
Ramifications of McFee v. Nursing Care Management of America, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 229 (2011).
54

See, e.g., Elizabeth Nash et al., Laws Affecting Reproductive Health and Rights: 2013 State Policy
Review, GUTTMACHER INST., http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/updates/2013/statetrends42013.html (last visited Mar.
28, 2015).
55

Patricia Hill Collins, Producing the Mothers of the Nations: Race, Class and Contemporary US
Population Policies, in WOMEN, CITIZENSHIP AND DIFFERENCE 118 (Nira Yuval-Davis & Pnina Werbner eds., 1999).
56

Id. at 120-26.
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C. The Feminist Approach
Unlike liberals, whose individualistic conception of autonomy and suspicion of
government lead them to adhere to a strict separation between the public and the private spheres,
most strands of feminist theory evaluate the desirability of fertility policies from quite a different
perspective.57 For feminists, the separation between the public and the private spheres is central to
women’s   oppression   and   subordination.58 Feminists argue that patriarchal societies confine
women to the private sphere, where they are expected to take unremunerated care of the family
and the children, as part of their duties of love. 59 Unlike the public sphere where principles of
justice and the rights discourse prevail, the family is often perceived to be beyond justice.60
Professor Michael Sandel warns that applying the principles of justice within the family will
result  in  the  loss  of  “nobler  virtues,” 61 such as affection, self-sacrifice, and generosity.
These  views  of  women’s  place  in  the  family  and  the  practices that they legitimate serve
as  the  practical,  as  well  as  the  normative,  basis  for  women’s  oppression.  Societies  and  states  need  
children in order to ensure their continuation and use women, without remuneration, in order to
give birth to children and to raise them.62 This releases men, as well as the state, from the
demanding duties of care involved in the rearing of children, and the public-private divide
conceals this unjust exploitation.63 Other means through which this concealment is achieved are
the ideology of motherhood and the myth of love. 64 These   portray   motherhood   as   a   woman’s  
vocation  and  convey  a  powerful  message  that  a  mother’s  love  requires  that  a  woman  sacrifice  all  
her wants and needs for the benefit of her family and children. 65 Furthermore,   women’s   equal  
rights in the polity are sometimes seen as stemming from and predicated on their fulfillment of
their roles as mothers.66
The exploitation of women for childbearing and rearing occurs both in traditional and

57
On the individualistic nature of the traditional conception of autonomy, see Catriona Mackenzie &
Natalie Stoljar, Introduction to RELATIONAL AUTONOMY FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON AUTONOMY, AGENCY, AND THE
SOCIAL SELF 3, 5-6 (Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar eds., 2000).
58
Stopler, supra note 28,  at  6.  While  there  are  multiple  feminist  approaches  and  their  analyses  of  women’s  
subordination   vary,   I   use   “feminist   theory”   in   the   singular   to   indicate   the   basic   agreement   that   exists   between   these  
approaches with regard to the claims that I discuss.
59
Dana Freibach-Heifetz & Gila Stopler, On Conceptual Dichotomies and Social Oppression, 34 PHIL. &
SOC. CRITICISM 515, 520-21 (2008).
60

See SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 25-40 (1989).

61

MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 34 (2d ed. 1998).

62

Stopler, supra note 28, at 6.

63

Stopler, supra note 28, at 6; Freibach-Heifetz & Stopler, supra note 59, at 520.

64

Stopler, supra note 28, at 6.

65
Id.; see Freibach-Heifetz & Stopler, supra note 59, at 520; see generally Gila Stopler, Gender
Construction and the Limits of Liberal Equality, 15 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 43 (2005); see also Nitza Berkovitch,
Motherhood as a National Mission, 20 WOMEN’S STUD. INT’L F. 605, 605-10 (1997) (discussing the construction of
womanhood in Israel); JACQUELINE PORTUGESE, FERTILITY POLICY IN ISRAEL: THE POLITICS OF RELIGION, GENDER, AND
NATION 2 (1998).
66

E.g., Berkovitch, supra note 65, at 615.
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religious communities, as well as in liberal capitalist societies.67 The structure of the liberal
capitalist  state  is  “predicated  on  leaving  the  duty  to  care  for  children  in  the  hands  of  the  family,  
i.e., with the mother, and on freeing the state, society, the market, and men from any obligations
in  this  respect.”68 The ideology of choice that has been the basis for the Roe decision serves the
liberal   capitalist   structure   as   an   important   justification   for   women’s   exclusive   responsibility   for  
their children. As West argues, since Roe gives women the right to choose to enter into a
contractual obligation to perform an abortion, a woman who chooses to forgo the opportunity to
abort and decides to give birth and to parent the child is seen as making her own private choice,
which there is no reason to publicly subsidize, no matter how costly it is. 69 The liberal portrayal of
childbearing and rearing as an activity which the state does not have and cannot have any interest
in, further strengthens the argument that the state has no responsibility to assist with it.
Nevertheless, as we have seen, all governments have an interest in the number of children born in
their countries, but liberal capitalist governments are satisfied to leave the task of persuading
people to bear children to religious communities while leaving the duties of care to the parents,
and especially to mothers.70
How does all this affect the feminist perspective on fertility policies? Theoretically,
feminist   awareness   of   the   ways   in   which   states   and   communities   exploit   women’s   reproductive
roles  might  result  in  their  adamant  rejection  of  states’  right  to  set  and  implement  fertility  policies.  
Another reason for feminists to reject state involvement in matters of reproduction is the value
that feminists place on choice and autonomy. Although most feminists perceive autonomy as a
positive relational right, while liberals understand it as a negative individualistic one, both
feminists and liberals posit that free choice is fundamentally important, and are concerned that
women might be coerced into having children by their states or communities. 71 Consequently, all
strands within feminist theory seem to agree that the lack of reproductive choice is a central
means for the oppression of women. 72 Thus,  just  as  the  rallying  cry  “government,  stay  out of my
uterus”   suggests,   a   complete   withdrawal   of   the   state   from   any   and   all   reproduction   issues   may  
seem  the  most  conducive  to  the  protection  of  women’s  rights.
Nevertheless, as I have already argued, a complete withdrawal of the state from all
reproduction issues is not possible. There are two interrelated reasons why feminists should
support some forms of fertility policies—and should even regard them as indispensable to
equality for women.73 The first reason is that feminists, above all others, understand that in order
to  achieve  equality  for  women,  “the  perception  that  raising  children  is  a   woman’s  job,  to  which  

67
Stopler, supra note 28, at 6-7. See Gila Stopler, Countenancing the Oppression of Women: How Liberals
Tolerate Religious and Cultural Practices That Discriminate Against Women, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 154 (2003), for
a  discussion  of  a  woman’s  role  in  traditional  and  religious  societies.
68
Stopler, supra note 28, at 7; see Stopler, Gender Construction and the Limits of Liberal Equality, supra
note 65, at 70; OKIN, supra note 60.
69

See West, supra note 21, at 1410-11.

70

Freibach-Heifetz & Stopler, supra note 59, at 519-20.

71

Stopler, supra note 28, at 7. On the differences between the feminist and the liberal conceptions of
autonomy, see Mackenzie & Stoljar, supra note 57, at 5.
72

Stopler, supra note 28, at 7; PORTUGESE, supra note 65, at 1.

73

The discussion of these two reasons, which follows, is adapted from Stopler, supra note 28, at 7-8.
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she  must  dedicate  herself  with  no  remuneration  and  no  help,  must  fundamentally  change.” 74 There
should be recognition of the fact that raising children is the duty of both parents and that they
must share the care duties that this important task involves. 75 If parenting is shared by both
parents, and the constraints that arise from the care duties towards children affect both men and
women, then the labor market would have to adapt to these constraints by implementing parentfriendly policies—such as flexible working hours.76 The state would facilitate and enforce this
adaptation through protective legislation.77 Furthermore, the state would be obliged to support
parents’  efforts  to  combine  their  care  duties  with  participation  in  the  job  market  by  supplying  lowcost, high-quality day care and tax-deductible care services.78
The second reason why feminists should support fertility policies despite their
intervention in the private sphere is that much of the oppression of women by individuals and
communities occurs in this sphere.79 Liberals prefer to turn a blind eye to the fact that in some
communities, women are expected to give birth to a large number of children without having any
meaningful choice in the matter.80 While according to liberal myth, by staying clear of the private
sphere,  “the  state  allows  everyone  the  freedom  to  choose  and  to  act  out  of  their  own  free  will,”  the  
reality is that by staying  clear  of  the  private  sphere  “the  state  facilitates  the  continued  existence  of  
private  power  over  women’s  bodies  and  procreative  abilities.” 81 Thus, as will be discussed below,
feminists may, under certain conditions, support fertility policies that are aimed at reducing
fertility rates in religious communities that pressure women into having an inordinately high
number of children.82
Even in the United States, where the individualistic, negative rights, choice-based, Roeinspired understanding of reproductive rights prevails, some feminist legal scholars, such as
Professor Reva Siegel, have for years been advocating a positive rights, equality-based analysis of
reproductive rights.83 These scholars have even been supporting government regulation of
reproduction that is compatible with the Equal Protection Clause and with the guarantee of equal
sexual freedom.84 A detailed list of positive reproductive rights that should be protected through
expansive fertility policies is provided by West, who posits that:

74

Stopler, supra note 28, at 7.

75

Id.

76

Id. at 7-8.

77

Id. at 8.

78

Id.

79

Id.

80

Stopler, supra note 28, at 8.

81

Id.

82

See infra Part III.B.

83
See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their Critical Basis and
Evolving Constitutional Expression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815, 842 (2007).
84
For examples of such writings supporting the equality analysis, see Symposium, Sex Equality Arguments
for Reproductive Rights: Their Critical Basis and Evolving Constitutional Expression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815 (2007); Lilith,
supra note 52. See generally PORTUGESE, supra note 65.
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Reproductive justice requires a state that provides a network of support for the
processes of reproduction: protection against rape and access to affordable and
effective birth control, healthcare, including but not limited to abortion services,
prenatal care, support in childbirth and postpartum, support for breastfeeding
mothers, early childcare for infants and toddlers, income support for parents
who stay home to care for young babies, and high quality public education for
school age children.85
Clear support   for   the   setting   of   fertility   policies   that   advance   both   women’s   rights   and  
the legitimate interests of states can be found on the international level. International law
recognized that states have the right to establish population and fertility policies. The United
Nations International Conference on Population and Development held in 1994 in Cairo adopted a
feminist position,86 and   its   Programme   of   Action   (“Cairo   Plan   of   Action”)   states   that   the  
empowerment of women and gender equality are cornerstones of policies related to development
and population.87 Thus, according to the Cairo Plan of Action, states have both the right and the
duty  “to  implement  population  policies  that  strive  to  ensure  women’s  full  and  equal  participation  
in both public and private life, their full equality in education, in economic life, in employment, in
decision making and in household responsibilities, and their full access to and autonomy with
respect  to  reproductive  health.”88
D. How to Assess the Legitimacy of Fertility Policies
The above discussion has identified three types of interests that fertility policies may
serve: legitimate state and group interests, individual liberty interests, such as autonomy and
privacy, and individual equality interests. On the basis of the above discussion, I claim that the
legitimacy of a given fertility policy should be assessed by examining it against these interests,
and that two rules should guide this examination. First, similar to any other government policy,
fertility policies can only be based   on   a   state’s   need   to   promote   legitimate   interests   (the  
“legitimate   interests   prong”).   As   will   be   further   discussed   below,   this   rule   leads   me   to   oppose  
both fertility policies that are aimed at promoting clearly illegitimate interests, and fertility
policies that promote interests that may upon first glance seem facially legitimate, but a closer
examination would reveal that they cannot be deemed legitimate in a democratic society that
respects human rights.89 This would lead me to reject fertility policies such as the Chinese one85

West, supra note 21, at 1425.

86

See Int’l  Conference  on  Population  &  Dev.,  Cairo,  Egypt,  Sept.  5-13, 1994, Report of the International
Conference on Population and Development U.N. Doc. A/CONF.171/13/Rev.1 [hereinafter ICPD REPORT]; Programme
of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development, in ICPD REPORT, 1-115 [hereinafter Cairo Plan
of Action].
87

Cairo Plan of Action, supra note 86, at 12 (Principle 4).

88

Stopler, supra note 28, at 8; see Cairo Plan of Action, supra note 86, at 22, 40.

89

See Pildes, supra note 44, at 750 (explaining exclusionary reasons which governments can never use as
justification for limiting individual rights). For examples or interests that cannot be deemed legitimate in a democratic
society that respects human rights, see European Convention on Human Rights, art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222
(stating  that  “[e]veryone  has  the  right  to  respect  for  his  private  and  family  life”  and  that  “[t]here shall be no interference by
a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a
democratic society”  (emphasis  added)).
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child policy90 as well as various restrictions on abortion.91 Second, due to the primacy of
individual rights, even legitimate state and group interests in fertility can only be realized while
respecting and promoting individual rights,   especially   individual   women’s   liberty   and   equality  
rights   (the   “liberty   and   equality   prong”).   Since,   as   I   have   shown,   fertility   policies   focused   on  
nonintervention   and   motivated   solely   by   liberty   concerns   are   insufficient   to   ensure   women’s  
rights, any   fertility   policy   should   simultaneously   protect   both   women’s   liberty   interests   and  
women’s   equality   interests.   Furthermore,   any   policy   should   satisfy   both   prongs   of   the   test—the
legitimate interest prong and the liberty and equality prong—concurrently, in order to be
considered a legitimate fertility policy.
The test just described is mainly motivated by feminist concerns. However, feminist
theory, as a humanist theory that is acutely aware of the need to secure equal rights not only for
women but also for other oppressed minorities, is highly sensitive to the fact that by shaping
fertility policies according to ethnic, racial, religious, or class parameters, states and communities
can ensure not only the continued control of men over women, but also the continued control of
other dominant groups over minority groups. 92 A liberal might argue that this problem should
persuade us to adopt the liberal stance shunning state involvement in fertility, as the cost of such
involvement exceeds its benefit. Nevertheless, because of the clear need for fertility policies in
order  to  ensure  women’s  liberty  and  equality  rights,  discussed  above,  feminists  would  reject  this  
position  and  posit  that  the  proper  solution  for  the  need  to  prevent  abuse  of  government’s  power  to  
set fertility policies is for courts to apply close scrutiny to government fertility policies, and
especially those that seem to differentiate between groups on the basis of race, religion, ethnicity,
and the like. Such careful scrutiny can expose the illegitimate motivations behind fertility policies
where they are present, and may result in their invalidation.
In the reminder of the Article, I will describe various fertility policies that exist in
different parts of the world and assess their compatibility with the suggested test. I will begin by
describing pronatalist fertility policies, aimed at increasing fertility rates, move on to discussing
antinatalist fertility policies, aimed at decreasing fertility rates, and end with a discussion of
eugenic fertility policies.
II. PRONATALIST FERTILITY POLICIES AND THEIR LIMITS
A. The Rationale for Pronatalist Fertility Policies 93
Throughout history, large populations were considered necessary to ensure national
strength and economic growth. 94 Consequently,   states’   fertility policies were pronatalistic.
Religious ideologies—such as Christianity, Islam and Judaism—which believed procreation to be
a sacred duty, as well as ethnic and nationalistic ideologies, also encouraged procreation. Thus,
for example, contraception and abortion are opposed by the Catholic Vatican because of the
90

For history  and  analysis  of  China’s  one-child policy, see Xizhe Peng, Population Policy and Program in
China: Challenge and Prospective, 35 TEX. INT’L L.J. 51 (2000); infra Part IV.
91

For examples of restrictions on abortion, see Nash et al., supra note 54; infra Part III.

92

PORTUGESE, supra note 65, at 2; see infra Part IV.A.

93

This Subpart relies primarily on arguments put forth in Gila Stopler, Women as Bearers of the Nation:
Between Liberal and Ethnic Citizenship, in DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP AND WAR, 164, 168 (Yoav Peled et al. eds., 2011).
94

Stopler, supra note 93; Finkle & McIntosh, supra note 24, at 3; Demeny, supra note 16, at 752.
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sanctity of procreation.95 Islam encourages procreation as well as early motherhood and sees
women’s   role   as   bringing   children   into   the   world. 96 Traditional Judaism restricts the use of
contraception and abortion and holds that the duty to procreate is of the highest order. 97
In times of ethnic and national conflicts, ethnic and national communities measure
women’s   contribution   to   the   community   through   their   ability   to   reproduce   the   members   of   the
struggling community.98 What   makes   women’s   reproductive   role   so   important   is   that   “the  
‘common  origin’  of  the  community  members,  whether  true  or  imagined,  is  the  central  criterion  for  
belonging.”99 Lastly, in recent years, the shrinking of the population in many countries in Europe
and its changing age composition have triggered more modern concerns such as public spending
on elderly care, pensions and health care, and the size of the workforce. 100 Consequently, the
European  Commission’s  Green  Paper  on  the  demographic change transforming Europe posits that
influencing  women’s  fertility  and  control  over  immigration  are  the  central  means  states  have  for  
influencing their demographic compositions. 101 For national, ethnic, and religious communities,
control over women’s   fertility   is   even   more   important,   since   these   communities   do   not   usually  
have control over immigration into the state in which they reside. 102
If raising fertility rates can be so important to states and communities, the question that
needs to be examined is which pronatalist fertility policies can be considered legitimate and which
cannot. Pronatalist fertility policies can range from restrictive, punitive measures such as criminal
95

Stopler, supra note 93; see Charles B. Keely, Limits to Papal Power: Vatican Inaction after Humanae
Vitae, in THE NEW POLITICS OF POPULATION: CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS IN FAMILY PLANNING 220, 222 (Jason L. Finkle
& C. Alison McIntosh, eds., 1994).
96

Stopler, supra note 93; see Ali A. Mazrui, Islamic Doctrine and the Politics of Induced Fertility Change:
An African Perspective, in THE NEW POLITICS OF POPULATION: CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS IN FAMILY PLANNING 121,
121-22 (Jason L. Finkle & C Alison McIntosh, eds., 1994).
97

Stopler, supra note 93; see PORTUGESE, supra note 65, at 46-47.

98

Stopler, supra note 93; see Floya Anthias & Nira Yuval-Davis, Introduction to WOMAN—NATION—
STATE, 1, 6-10 (Nira Yuval-Davis & Floya Anthias, eds., 1989). According to Yuval-Davis and Anthias, women
participate in ethnic and national processes in five major ways:
(a) as biological reproducers of members of ethnic collectivities;
(b) as reproducers of the boundaries of ethnic [or] national groups;
(c) as participating centrally in the ideological reproduction of the collectivity and as transmitters of
its culture;
(d) as signifiers of ethnic [or] national differences—as a focus and symbol in ideological discourses
used in construction, reproduction and transformation of ethnic [or] national categories;
(e) as participants in national, economic, political and military struggles.
Id. at 7. For historical examples of the effects of nationalism and ethnic conflict on state reproductive policies, see Patrizia
Albanese, Abortion & Reproductive Rights under Nationalist Regimes in Twentieth Century Europe, WOMEN’S HEALTH &
URB. LIFE, May 1, 2004, at 8.
99

Stopler, supra note 93 (citing NIRA YUVAL-DAVIS, GENDER & NATION 26-27 (1997)).

100

See OECD, supra note 43, at 1; see also Comm’n  of  European  Communities, supra note 43.

101

Comm’n  of  European  Communities, supra note 43, at 5-6; Stopler, supra note 93.

102
For a discussion of modern Protestant pronatalism in the United States, see John McKeown, Receptions
of Israelite Nation-building: Modern Protestant Natalism and Martin Luther, 49 DIALOG 133 (2010).
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prohibitions on abortion and on the use of contraception, to supportive measures such as free high
quality day cares and flexible job markets. 103 In what follows, I will discuss several examples of
pronatalist fertility policies adopted in different countries, including various restrictions on
abortion, ideological pronatalist propaganda, and supportive measures aimed at alleviating the
burdens of childbearing and rearing. I will examine these policies against the suggested test for
evaluating the legitimacy of fertility policies.
B. Restrictions on Abortion
There is a range of restrictions that governments can set on abortion.104 In this Article, I
will focus on a few examples ranging from total prohibitions on abortion, through the
requirements of state authorization for abortion and pre-abortion counseling, to the refusal to fund
abortion. While this is merely a partial list of the many possible restrictions, it is sufficient to
demonstrate the way in which the analysis of such restrictions should be made using the test
suggested in this Article.
1. Bans on Abortion
Throughout most parts of the twentieth century, a nearly complete ban on abortion
existed in many countries around the world with different ideological leanings, including, for
example, the Soviet Union, France, Germany, Romania, Japan and the United States. 105 If we
examine these strict bans on abortion according to the two-pronged test suggested here, such bans
fail both the legitimate interest prong and the liberty and equality prong. While the interest of
increasing   a   state’s   population   cannot   be   considered   illegitimate in and of itself, the interest of
increasing   a   state’s   population   as   quickly   as   possible   and   without   regard   to   the   rights   of  
individuals involved, which has motivated at least some of the countries mentioned, cannot be
considered a legitimate interest in a democratic society that is sensitive to individual rights. Of
course, many of the countries mentioned here were not democratic countries that respected human
rights at the time they pursued these policies, and this may be one reason they adopted such
policies. However, this should not exempt fertility policies in these countries from being assessed
from  a  human  rights  perspective  and  found  wanting.  Thus,  In  Nicolae  Ceauşescu’s  Romania,  the  
“need   to   obtain   quick   results   with   a   minimal   economic   cost”   in   the effort to increase the
population is what motivated the regime to opt for a strict ban on abortion and for limitation and
marginalization of contraception and of sexual education, instead of choosing to increase fertility

103

For examples of supportive measures that will be further discussed below, see Comm’n   of   European  
Communities, supra note 43 (describing the measures taken to promote natality in the European Union).
104

For a range of recent restrictions various state governments in the United States are placing on abortion,
see Nash et al., supra note 54. See also Katie McDonough, The 5 Most Dangerous Abortion Restrictions of 2013, SALON
(Dec. 19, 2013, 7:44 AM), http://www.salon.com/2013/12/19/the_5_most_dangerous_abortion_restrictions_of_2013.
105

On the Soviet Union, France, and Germany, see David L. Hoffmann, Mothers in the Motherland:
Stalinist Pronatalism in Its Pan-European Context, 34 J. SOCIAL HIST. 35, 38-40 (2000). On Romania, see Soare, supra
note 15. On Japan, see Miyazaki, supra note 15, at 794-95. On the United States, see Christopher Z. Mooney & Mei-Hsien
Lee, Legislating Morality in the American States: The Case of Pre-Roe Abortion Regulation Reform, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI.
599, 602-03 (1995). For a history of perspectives on abortion in the United States, see Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the
Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261 (1992).
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rates through economic incentives, as was suggested by some.106 When a state defines its interest
in a manner that completely disregards its adverse effects on human rights, that interest cannot be
considered legitimate.
Another central interest motivating bans on abortion, which at first glance appears
legitimate, is the interest in protecting the life of the fetus. However, a closer look at this interest
reveals that its legitimacy is questionable. First, as a matter of law, fetuses were not recognized as
persons except for very specific circumstances.107 Second, and more importantly, as Professor
Judith Jarvis Thomson shows in her classical defense of abortion, even if we assume that the fetus
is a person and has a right to life from the moment of conception, which it cannot realize without
the help of its mother, it does not follow that the woman has an obligation to sacrifice nine
months of her life in order to help the fetus realize this right. 108 In fact, in no other context, except
pregnancy, are people considered as having a legal obligation to sacrifice anything in order to
help others realize their right to life. 109 This is a clear indication that such demands—that women
sacrifice their privacy, autonomy, bodily integrity and health for the sake of the fetus—are
motivated first and foremost  by  stereotypical  perceptions  of  women’s  roles  and  their  obligations  
of love and sacrifice, and much less by a genuine and general concern in law and morality for the
right to life.110 Consequently, the interest of a state in the right to life of the fetus, if
unaccompanied by a similarly deep interest in the right to life in other contexts, is an interest
motivated by biases and stereotypical views of women and is therefore illegitimate.
Even if fertility policies banning abortion could survive the legitimate interest prong of
the test suggested here, the policies would fail the liberty and equality prong. Prohibiting abortion
violates   women’s   rights   to   privacy   and   autonomy   over   their   own   bodies   and   over   their   most  
important life decisions. At the same time,  a  ban  on  abortion  violates   women’s  right  to  equality  
since it imposes gender-differentiated burdens on women, which are not imposed on men. Forcing
women to carry a pregnancy to term and give birth to a child whom they do not want deprives
them of dignity, health, happiness, and freedom in a manner in which men are not deprived. 111 As
Siegel explains:
Control over whether and when to give birth is practically important to women
for reasons inflected with gender-justice   concern:   It   crucially   affects   women’s  
health and sexual freedom, their ability to enter and end relationships, their
education and job training, their ability to provide for their families, and their
ability to negotiate work-family conflicts in institutions organized on the basis
of traditional sex-role assumptions that this society no longer believes fair to
enforce, yet is unwilling institutionally to redress. 112

106

Soare, supra note 15, at 75-76.

107

Dawn E. Johnsen, The   Creation   of   Fetal   Rights:   Conflicts   with   Women’s   Constitutional   Rights   to  
Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599, 600-04 (1986).
108

Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47, 57-59, 64-65 (1971).

109

Id. at 63.

110

See Siegel, supra note 83, at 817.

111

See id. at 817-19.

112

Id. at 819.
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2. State Authorization of Abortion and Pre-Abortion Counseling
Somewhat less restrictive ways to decrease the number of abortions are to take the
control over the decision to abort out of the hands of the woman, as is done in Israel, or to subject
her to requirements that would weaken her resolve to abort, as is done in Germany.
i. Israel
From early on, the state of Israel has been concerned with the need to increase fertility
rates in order to ensure the survival of the Jewish people. This concern has led the government to
establish   a   Center   of   Demography   and   to   entrust   it   with   carrying   out   the   government’s   fertility  
policies.113 The government’s  policy  on  abortion  was  influenced  by  a  report  (the  “Beky  Report”)  
of a special Commission for Natality Problems that was appointed by the government. 114
Although at the time Israeli law criminalized all abortion, it was not being enforced and illegal
abortions were being carried out freely. 115 The commission, which concluded that abortion
constituted a serious demographic concern, recommended the enactment of a new law that would
criminalize all abortions unless they were approved by a special committee, and would be strictly
enforced.116 The committee would only approve a minimal number of abortions, and approval
would  be  granted  “only  after  an  attempt  was  made  to  persuade  the  woman  to  carry  the  pregnancy  
to   term.”117 Subsequently, Israeli law was amended in 1977 to allow only abortions that are
approved by special pregnancy termination committees, which are authorized to permit the
abortion only if certain conditions stipulated in the law are met, such as that the pregnancy
constitutes a risk to the mother or that it was conceived out of wedlock. 118 After the law was
amended, the Center of Demography, together with the Health Ministry, initiated a policy
stipulating that before filling a request to a pregnancy termination committee for an authorization
of abortion, a woman is required to attend mandatory counseling with a social worker whose job
113

Government Decision Number 428, 9.4.67 (1967) (Hebrew). The decision includes, among other things,
the  following  “[s]uggestions  regarding  the  demographic  policy”:  
The Government recognizes the need to act systematically in order to implement a demographic
policy targeted at creating an atmosphere that will encourage natality, considering its importance to
the future of the Jewish people. . . . For that purpose: [] Constant advertising campaigns will be
held, efforts will be made to curb economic and social barriers will be removed and incentives will
be   given,   in  the   fields   of   education,  housing,  insurance   and   so   on,   within   the   scope   of   the   state’s  
ability, in order to encourage families to increase their number of children. [] efforts will be made to
curb artificial abortions will be curbed as their high rate is cause for concern, in both nationaldemographic  terms,  and  in  terms  of  women’s  health.
Id.
114

The Report of the Commission for Natality Problems, Jerusalem, 1966 [hereinafter Beky Report] (Isr.)
(Hebrew) (on file with author).
115

Stopler, supra note 93, at 169; see Criminal Code Ordinance: An Ordinance to Provide a General Penal
Code for Palestine (1936), 16 Geo. 6, c. 17, § 175 (Eng.).
116

Stopler, supra note 93, at 169 (citing Beky Report, supra note 114, at 19-20, 44).

117

Id. (citing Beky Report, supra note 114, at 44).

118
Penal Law, 5737-1977, 31 LSI 84, §§ 312-21 (1976-1978) (Isr.); An Act Amending the Penal Laws
(Termination of Pregnancy), 1977, SH No. 842 (Isr.).
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it is to try to persuade her to forgo the request and carry the pregnancy to term. 119 This policy is
still in force today.120
If we examine the Israeli abortion policy according to the test suggested in this Article, it
seems to fail both the legitimate interest prong and the liberty and equality prong. Israeli
government   decisions   regarding   Israel’s   demographic   policy   plainly   state   that   Israel’s   fertility  
policies are motivated  by  the  government’s  concern  with  Jewish  population  growth. 121 While it is
legitimate for a particular ethnic or religious group to be interested only in its own growth, and
not in the growth of other groups, it is highly questionable whether such an interest is legitimate
for a state, which should be neutral towards all its citizens and equally interested in the welfare of
119

MINISTRY OF HEALTH, CIRCULAR 43/88, PREGNANCY TERMINATION COMMITTEES (1988) (Isr.)
(Hebrew); MINISTRY OF HEALTH, CIRCULAR 64/90, INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING INFORMATION PROVIDED TO WOMEN
APPLYING TO PREGNANCY TERMINATION COMMITTEES AND COMMITTEE PROCEDURES, § 2(b) (1990) (Isr.) (Hebrew);
MINISTRY OF HEALTH, CIRCULAR 23/93, EXECUTION OF THE LAW AND REGULATIONS BY THE PREGNANCY TERMINATION
COMMITTEES (1993) (Isr.) (Hebrew), available at http://www.health.gov.il/hozer/mk23_1993.pdf; Planned Termination of
Pregnancy (Abortion), ISRAEL MINISTRY OF HEALTH, http://www.health.gov.il/English/Topics/Pregnancy/Abortion/
Pages/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 28, 2015).
120

See Planned Termination of Pregnancy (Abortion), ISRAEL MINISTRY OF
http://www.health.gov.il/English/Topics/Pregnancy/Abortion/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 28, 2015).

HEALTH,

The importance of the meeting with the social worker stems from the fact that if the woman files a
request and meets the criteria stipulated by law for allowing abortions, such as that the pregnancy is
out  of  wedlock,  the  committee  will  most  likely  approve  the  abortion.  The  social  worker’s  job  is  to  
both to alert women to the fact that they do not meet the criteria and should therefore not file a
request, and even more importantly to persuade those women that do meet the criteria not to file the
request and to carry the pregnancy to term. It should be noted that the committee does not require a
woman who claims that the pregnancy is out of wedlock to prove her claim and thus potentially,
almost any woman can obtain an abortion by stating that the pregnancy is out of wedlock.
Stopler, supra note 93, at 177 n.14.
121

In addition to the 1967 decision quoted in note 113 above and the Beky Report, supra note 114, the
Israeli government made another decision regarding its demographic policy in 1986, which reads as follows:
1596. The demographic trends among the Jewish people Decision:
a. The government is concerned by the demographic trends in Israel and the Diaspora and is
particularly worried about the slow-down of population growth in Israel, the decreasing Aliyah, and
the rate of emigration as well as by the increase in assimilation and in mixed marriages in the
Diaspora.
b. The government decides to establish a comprehensive, coordinated, long-term demographic
policy, that will strive inter alia to achieve a proper level of Jewish population growth and in order
to achieve this goal it encourages cooperation with organizations representing the Jewish people and
the Diaspora Jews.
c. The policy will be based on direction, coordination and the implementation of measures that can
affect population growth such as: encouraging the creation of families and their desire for children,
strengthening families and removing barriers in their way, preventing unnecessary abortions—
through proper information and guidance; welfare assistance for families who have difficulties in
raising their children, encouraging Aliyah; and taking steps to stop the emigration and to encourage
Israelis living abroad to return to Israel.
Government Decision Number 1596, 18.5.86 (1986) (Hebrew).
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all groups under its purview. It seems that when a government declares that it is only interested in
increasing the birth rates of the majority ethnic group, it violates the equality rights of minority
groups, even if the policies adopted to achieve its purpose are applied equally to all. 122 The mere
knowledge that the state is more interested in the welfare of one group over the welfare of another
denigrates the members of the second group and violates their dignity. 123
Another problem with the interests behind the Israeli abortion law is that the conditions
under which it allows abortion are clearly crafted according to the dictates of Jewish religious
law. Thus, the law authorizes pregnancy termination committees to approve abortion under very
limited conditions, including where there is a valid medical or psychological concern that may
affect the woman or the fetus, where the woman is under the age of marriage or over the age of
forty, and where the pregnancy is out of wedlock. 124 While the first two conditions are standard
and highly restrictive, the last condition for approving an abortion—that the pregnancy is out of
wedlock—may be religiously motivated.125 Under Jewish religious law, a child born out of
wedlock to a married mother is considered religiously illegitimate, and even if the mother is
unmarried, there is a relatively high risk that the child would be religiously illegitimate because its
father may be unknown. Consequently, Israeli law allows women to abort if the fetus was
conceived out of wedlock, and many of the abortions approved in Israel are approved under this
section.126 No exception exists for abortion requested due to financial or social hardship.127 Thus,
the  interest  motivating  Israel’s  restrictive  abortion  policy  is  the  increase  in  the  number  of  births  of  
religiously legitimate Jewish children. Here, again, while such an interest may have arguably been
considered legitimate for a religious group, it cannot be considered legitimate for a state, which, at
least according to liberal and human rights perceptions, is not allowed to impose religiously
motivated restrictions on its population. 128
In addition to failing the legitimate  interest  prong,  Israel’s  restrictive  abortion  policy  fails  
the liberty and equality prong of the test suggested in this Article. Israeli law takes the power to
decide  whether  to  abort  entirely  out  of  the  woman’s  hands,  entrusting  it  to  a  committee  of  experts
who are themselves bound by the strict requirements of the law and cannot, for example, approve
an abortion on financial grounds such as that the woman is financially incapable of taking care of
122

When the Center of Demography was charged with being racist because its mandate is to promote an
increase in Jewish birth rates alone, the chairman of the Center responded that all policies decided by the Center will be
applied equally to all citizens. Stopler, supra note 15, at 509-10.
123

Id. at 511-12.

124

Sections 312-321 of the Israeli Penal Act, 1977, stipulate the conditions for the operation of the
Termination of Pregnancies Committees and specify the exact instances in which a committee is authorized to approve an
abortion. Penal Law, 5737-1977, 31 LSI 84, §§ 312-21 (1976-1978) (Isr.).
125

Stopler, supra note 15, at 488-89.

126

See id. at 489; Press Release, Application for Pregnancy Termination in 2009, and Temporary Data
2010, CENT. BUREAU STAT., 1, 6-8 (Sept. 20, 2011) (Isr.) (Hebrew), http://www.cbs.gov.il/reader/newhodaot/
hodaa_template.html?hodaa=201105237 (stating that 51.4% of approved abortions involved an out-of-wedlock
pregnancy).
127
Id. at 488. Such a provision existed in the original law but was removed because of objections from antiabortionists and religious political parties. Id.
128
See JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT, 191-92 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001) (positing that
a political doctrine is unreasonable when it forces people to accept rules that give them fewer rights than others, such as
when one faith is protected and another is not).
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a child.129 The   usurpation  of  a   woman’s  control  over   her   body, the demand that she expose the
most intimate details of her life before a committee of strangers and entrust her well-being, her
health and her entire future in their hands, and her ultimate coercion, in some instances, into
carrying the pregnancy to term,  all  constitute  severe  infringements  of  women’s  fundamental  right  
over their bodies as well as their fundamental rights to liberty, dignity, privacy, and equality.
Furthermore, by compelling the woman to meet with a social worker whose aim is to persuade the
pregnant woman not to file a request for abortion and to carry the pregnancy to term, the state
exercises an unfair influence on women in their toughest moments, while demeaning them and
showing disrespect for their capacity as moral agents. 130 Moreover, unless there are exceedingly
good reasons to believe otherwise, every human being should be regarded as an independent
moral agent, capable of weighing all the relevant factors and making her own decisions, in light of
her   best   interests.   Israel’s   refusal to view Israeli women as independent moral agents and to
entrust women with the decision to abort, and even the decision to file a request for an approval of
abortion, is a violation of their fundamental rights to autonomy and to dignity.
ii. Germany
This   last   point,   criticizing   the   state’s   clear   disrespect   for   women   as   moral   agents,   is  
similarly applicable to the German abortion scheme. German law declares abortion to be
illegal.131 However, if the woman undergoes counseling before the abortion, and the abortion is
carried out by a doctor during the first twelve weeks of pregnancy, and no less than three days
after the counseling, then the abortion is not punishable. 132 The German Penal Code declares that
the interest motivating the restrictions on abortion, as well as the counseling requirement, is the
right to life of the fetus.133 The wording of section 219 explicitly states the biased assumptions
regarding  women’s  duty  to  sacrifice  on  which  the  mandatory  counseling  is  predicated:
The counselling serves to protect unborn life. It should be guided by efforts to
encourage the woman to continue the pregnancy and to open her to the
prospects of a life with the child; it should help her to make a responsible and
conscientious decision. The woman must thereby be aware that the unborn child
has its own right to life with respect to her at every stage of the pregnancy and
that a termination of pregnancy can therefore only be considered under the law
in exceptional situations, when carrying the child to term would give rise to a
129

Stopler, supra note 15, at 488-90; Penal Law, 5737-1977, 31 LSI 84, §§ 312-21 (1976-1978) (Isr.).

130

See Nanette Funk, Abortion Counselling and the 1995 German Abortion Law, 12 CONN. J. INT’L L. 33,

58 (1996).
131

STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], Nov. 13, 1998, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL. I]
3322, as amended, § 218 (Ger.), English translation available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_
stgb/englisch_stgb.html.
132
Id. § 218a. See also Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVERFG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 28, 1993,
88 ENTSCEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 203, 1993 (Ger.) (abortion decision of the German
Constitutional Court).
133
STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], Nov. 13, 1998, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL. I]
3322, as amended, § 219 (Ger.), English translation available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/
englisch_stgb.html.
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burden for the woman which is so serious and extraordinary that it exceeds the
reasonable limits of sacrifice. The counselling should, through advice and
assistance, contribute to overcoming the conflict situation which exists in
connection with the pregnancy and remedying an emergency situation. 134
Thus, the restrictions placed on abortion by Israel and Germany, though differently
fashioned  and  differently  motivated,  are  both  based  on  illegitimate  interests  and  violate  women’s  
rights to liberty and equality. It is interesting to note that the recent restrictions which many states
in the United States are placing on abortion, including mandatory counseling and mandatory
ultrasounds, are closely associated ideologically and practically with the German scheme. While
each scheme of restrictions pursued by a state should be analyzed individually in order to
establish its validity according to the suggested test, it seems safe to say that, at least as far as
requirements such as mandatory ultrasounds that include the duty of the provider to display and
describe  the  image  to  the   woman  are  concerned,  such  schemes  would  violate  women’s  rights  as  
much as the German restrictive abortion policy does.135
3. State Refusal to Fund Abortion and to Guarantee Access to Them
Unlike the restrictions on abortion discussed thus far, where governments actively
restrict   women’s   right   to   abortion,   refusals   to   fund   abortions   and   to   guarantee   access   to   them  
constitute a different kind of restriction, since the government merely refuses to help women
abort, but does not actually prevent them from doing so, or even regulate the process. In the
United States, these types of restrictions have been affirmed by the Supreme Court as early as
1977, four years after Roe, when the Court held that states are not obligated to cover abortions
that are not necessary for health reasons under state Medicaid programs. 136 These rulings were
later expanded in Harris v. McRae, where the Court upheld restrictions that prevented any federal
funding for abortions,   except   for   those   that   were   “required   because   a   woman’s   life   was  
endangered   or   if   the   pregnancy   resulted   from   rape   or   incest.” 137 The court reasoned that not
funding abortion for indigent women does not create an obstacle to access to abortion, since the
obstacle  is  created  by  their  own  indigence  and  not  by  the  government’s  refusal  to  fund  abortion. 138
In the wake of Harris, these restrictions have been expanded to include a myriad of other abortion
restrictions, and lately, some states are working to further expand them to cover private insurance
health policies and clinics that include any abortion services through the Affordable Care Act. 139
The refusal to fund abortions for indigent women and to guarantee access to abortion
violates both prongs of the test suggested in this Article. It violates the legitimate interest prong

134

Id.

135

On state requirements for ultrasound see GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF:
REQUIREMENTS FOR ULTRASOUND (Mar. 1, 2015), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RFU.pdf.
136

Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 444-46 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 465-66, 478 (1977); Soohoo,
supra note 19, at 395-96.
137

Soohoo, supra note 136, at 396; Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980).

138

Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 316-17.

139
See Soohoo, supra note 19, at 417-18; Nicole Huberfeld, With  Liberty  and  Access  for  Some:  The  ACA’s  
Disconnect  for  Women’s  Health, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1357, 1382-83 (2013).
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since it is based on the interest of preserving the right to life of fetuses. As already discussed, a
comparison of the extensive protection afforded to the right to life of fetuses against their
mothers, with the legal protection given to the right to life in all other contexts, clearly exposes
that   the   defense   of   the   fetus’s   right   to   life   is   based   on   biased   assumptions   regarding   women’s  
duties towards their fetuses, and not on a genuine concern with the right to life. 140 As for the
liberty and equality prong, preventing indigent women from having abortions by preventing
funding  for  abortion  is  every  bit  as  restrictive  of  these  women’s  rights  to  liberty  and  equality  as  
state bans on abortion discussed above.141 Furthermore,   the   Court’s   reasoning   in   Harris clearly
exposes how inadequate Roe’s   concept   of   freedom   of   choice   as   a   negative   right   is   to   ensure  
reproductive justice for all women. As the Harris Court  explains:  “[I]t  simply  does  not follow that
a  woman’s  freedom  of  choice  carries  with  it  a  constitutional  entitlement  to  the  financial  resources  
to  avail  herself  of  the  full  range  of  protected  choices.” 142 Clearly, restricting the right to abortion
only to those women who can afford it is incompatible with the duty to respect the rights of all
women with respect to liberty and equality, both because it discriminates against indigent women
and because denies them the minimal conditions required to enable them to make a truly
autonomous choice whether to continue their pregnancy. 143
C. Ideological Propaganda
The question whether ideological propaganda is a legitimate means for achieving an
increase in fertility is an intricate one. For example, was it legitimate for the Israeli Center of
Demography   to   announce   in   the   1970s   that   “feminine   wholeness   combines   fertile   motherhood  
with   social   and   professional   status”   and   that   any   family   should   have   at   least   four   or   five  
children?144 Similarly, was it legitimate for the French government in the 1920s to bestow medals
on women with five or more children? 145 While ideological propaganda is undoubtedly less
coercive than bans and restrictions on abortion and contraception, the propaganda described here
would still seem to be incompatible with the test suggested in this Article. In terms of the
legitimate interest prong, I would argue that although a state may have a legitimate interest in
generally encouraging an increase in fertility rates, it is questionable whether an interest in
encouraging women to have at least four or five children can be considered legitimate in a
democratic society that respects individual rights. In a society that respects individual rights,
government must accept that different people will make different choices with regard to whether
they are interested in having children and how many children they want. The government may not
promote a certain number of children as the desired norm.
A similar problem arises in terms of the liberty and equality prong. Arguably, there is no
harm in propaganda   promoting   the   importance   of   large   families   and   a   woman’s   joy   in  
motherhood. If all adults are free and autonomous moral agents, then they should all be capable of
140

See supra Part II.B.1.

141

See Moshe Cohen-Eliya, Is Conditional Funding a Less Drastic Means?, 1 L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 354,

373-74 (2007).
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Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. at 316.
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See Soohoo, supra note 19, at 397, 402.
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See Stopler, supra note 15, at 487.
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See Hoffmann, supra note 105, at 42.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015

STOPLER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

194

4/7/2015 10:34 AM

UNIV. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE

[Vol. 18.2

assessing the validity of the propaganda and can act according to their best judgment. However,
ideological propaganda is not a benign phenomenon. According to Foucault, ideology is the
apparatus that allows the powerful to exercise power while at the same time masking it and
legitimating its existence.146 The power exercised through ideology is masked by creating an
illusion of free choice. 147 The person whose actions are ideologically determined appears to be
operating freely and under no coercion.148 In this manner, the powerful maintain control over the
less powerful while masking the coercive and oppressive nature of their actions. 149 As already
discussed, states and communities have a significant interest in encouraging women to give birth
and a tendency to view them as a means to that end and not as full human beings entitled to
absolute respect for their human rights. 150 Thus, in light of the common use of religious and
national  ideologies  which  emphasize  a  woman’s  vocation  as  a  mother,  urging  her  to  give  birth  to  
as many children as possible and perpetuating her subordination, any ideological propaganda
persuading women to procreate in order to promote ethnic, religious, or national goals should not
be permissible.
Thus I would argue that although a state may and should create a supportive environment
in which parents can raise their children in the best conditions while at the same time developing
their own skills and pursuing careers, it should not use ideological propaganda to encourage
procreation. Presumably, creating a supportive environment for families would increase birth
rates without any need for ideological pressures, since at least some of the people who have
refrained from having more children due to the difficulties in raising them would decide to have
them, if given the appropriate support.151
D. Support for Families
According to the test suggested in this Article to determine the legitimacy of various
fertility policies, such policies would be legitimate if they are aimed at realizing an interest that
can be considered legitimate in a democratic society that respects human rights, and if they
promote   women’s   liberty   and   equality   rights.   Generally   speaking,   policies   that   support   families  
meet both prongs of this test.
A survey done in twenty-three European countries in 2006 revealed that in all of the
countries surveyed, people wanted more children than they actually had. 152 Another survey
revealed similar results in the United States. 153 In Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development  (“OECD”)  countries  that  are  concerned  with  their  falling  fertility  rates,  increases  in  
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See Shane Phelan, Foucault and Feminism, 34 AM. J. POL. SCI. 421, 424 (1990).

147

Stopler, supra note 28, at 12.

148

Id. (citing Phelan, supra note 146, at 425).

149

Id.

150

See infra Part III.

151

For example, according to surveys done by the Israeli Center of Demography, while the average birth
rate in the Jewish population in Israel in the 1990s was around 2.6 children per family, the average number of children that
people wanted was 3.5. Stopler, supra note 15, at 488.
152

See OECD, DOING BETTER FOR FAMILIES 109 fig.3.9 (2011).
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See OECD, supra note 43, at 3 fig.2.
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fertility are not promoted through direct interference with fertility. 154 Instead, they are promoted
through a range of family policies which are aimed at achieving several objectives that are, at
least facially, all legitimate interests in democratic societies that respect human rights. These
policies aim to:
reconcile work and family responsibilities; increase parental employment and
combat poverty; mobilise female labour supply and promote gender equality;
promote conditions in which families can have the number of children they
desire at the time of their choice; and, promote child development and equal
opportunities among children for the future.155
The increase in the cost of raising children is considered a key reason for falling fertility
rates. These costs include both direct costs, such as child care, education, housing, food and
clothing, and indirect costs, which are the costs of opportunities that the parents, mostly mothers,
had to forgo in order to invest the necessary time in caring, educating, and raising the children.157
One way of measuring the opportunity costs for mothers is to compare the total earning forgone
by mothers during their career after childbirth with the earnings of childless women during the
same period.158 The difference between the accumulative earnings of these two groups is termed
the  “family  gap.”159 The  size  of  the  “family  gap”  varies  between  countries—women with children
stand to accumulate between 42% and 89% of the earnings of otherwise similar childless women,
depending on the country.160
Through the use of appropriate family policies, governments have the power to both
promote reproductive justice for women, and increase fertility rates. Studies show that different
family policies have different impacts on fertility rates. Financial transfers such as baby bonuses
have only a limited impact on fertility, as do the duration and payment of maternity (and
paternity) leave.161 Formal childcare services have the clearest positive effects on fertility. 162
Nevertheless, according to research done in OECD countries:
156

[I]t is the package of policies which helps reconcile work and family
commitments (including flexible workplace practices, parental leave
arrangements and early childhood education and care services) rather than each
single component which exerts a positive influence on fertility outcomes and
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See OECD, supra note 152, at 109.
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OECD, HOW CAN WE DO BETTER FOR OUR FAMILIES?: ISSUES, OUTCOMES, POLICY OBJECTIVES AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 1-2 (2011), available at www.oecd.org/els/soc/47701128.pdf; see OECD, supra note 152, at 107  .
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OECD, supra note 152, at 101.
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Id. at 105.

159

Id.

160

Id.

161

Id. at 110-13.
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Id. at 113-15.
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intentions, and helps maintain total fertility rates close to two children per
woman in France, New Zealand and the Nordic countries. 163
While governments do not have a duty to pursue specific policies merely because they
promote a particular interest, such as increased fertility rates, they should be regarded as dutybound   to   pursue   policies   that   promote   women’s   liberty   and   equality   rights.   For   example,   all  
member states of the European Union and the union itself are subject to the duty to integrate
gender equality into all their actions and policies. 164 Similarly, all states which are parties to the
Convention  on  the  Elimination  of  All  Forms  of  Discrimination  against  Women  (“CEDAW”)  are  
bound   to   “pursue   by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating
discrimination   against   women”   and   to   “ensure,   through   law   and   other   appropriate   means,   the  
practical   realization   of   [the   principle   of   the   equality   of   men   and   women].” 165 In the absence of
policies such as paid maternity leave, the provision of high quality subsidized child-care, or
protection  of  a  mother’s  right  to  express  breast  milk  at  work,  women  continue  to  suffer  losses  and  
discrimination as a result of using their reproductive capacities.166 Thus, not only are fertility
policies that support families and alleviate the costs that women have to pay for bearing children
legitimate policies, they are also an essential means of promoting reproductive justice. 167
III. ANTINATALIST FERTILITY POLICIES AND THEIR LIMITS
A. The Rational of Antinatalist Fertility Policies
The global opinion on population and fertility policy has changed dramatically in the last
several decades. The realization that military strength is dependent on the technological and
economic superiority of the state, and not on the size of its population—and the recognition that
the rapid increase in world population needs to be curbed—have resulted in the adoption of an
antinatalist population agenda.168 The origin of antinatalist population and fertility policies can be
found in the Malthusian population theory suggested by the Reverend Thomas Malthus, who
claimed  as  early  as  the  eighteenth  century  that  the  growth  rate  of  the  world’s  population  should  be  
curbed or the population would outrun   the   world’s   resources.169 The antinatalist position was
163

Id. at 90.
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See Teresa Rees, Reflections on the Uneven Development of Gender Mainstreaming in Europe, 7 INT’L
FEMINIST J. POL. 555-56 (2005).
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Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249
U.N.T.S. 13. art. 2. Unfortunately, the United States has not signed the CEDAW. For an argument that signing the
CEDAW would require the United States to ensure a far wider range of reproductive rights than it currently ensures,
including positive reproductive rights, see Barbara Stark, The   Women’s   Convention,   Reproductive   Rights,   and   the  
Reproduction of Gender, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 261 (2011).
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See Bhushan, supra note 19, at 677, 683, 689; Elissa Aaronson Goodman, Breastfeeding or Bust: The
Need  for  Legislation  to  Protect  a  Mother’s  Right  to  Express  Breast  Milk  at  Work, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 146, 150152 (2003).
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See discussion infra Part III.C.
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See Finkle & McIntosh, supra note 24, at 3-4.
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THOMAS MALTHUS, AN ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULATION 40-41, 44 (Electronic Scholarly
Publishing Project 1998) (1798), available at http://www.esp.org/books/malthus/population/malthus.pdf.
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adopted by the international community in the last several decades, first by the developed
countries towards the developing countries, and then by the developing countries as well. 170
Interestingly, despite its liberal sensibilities, which allegedly prevent it from engaging in fertility
policies within its own borders, the United States is considered the world leader in global
population stabilization efforts, and the single largest contributor of population and familyplanning funds among industrialized countries. 171
Perhaps the most striking example of an antinatalist fertility policy is the Chinese onechild policy. This policy, which was initiated by the Chinese government in 1979, was aimed at
radically reducing the fertility rate in China. 172 While the general goal of reducing fertility rates is
a legitimate one, the goal of reducing fertility rates to one child per family cannot be considered a
legitimate goal in a society that respects human rights; it completely disregards the reproductive
autonomy of individual women and men to decide on the number of children to have.
Furthermore, although officially the policy was not meant to be coercive, in practice it involved
serious violations of rights, especially   women’s   rights,   that   were   carried   out   at   the   local   and  
provincial levels, including forced abortion and sterilization, severe monetary fines, and denial of
public benefits.173
B. Antinatalist Fertility Policies and the Rights of Women in Traditional Communities
As the Cairo Plan of Action demonstrates, antinatalist fertility policies do not necessarily
have  to  be  restrictive  and  disrespectful  of  women’s  rights,  but  can  be  supportive  and  conducive  to  
the   advancement   of   women’s   reproductive   rights. 174 Supportive antinatalist fertility policies are
fertility   policies   that   aim   to   improve   women’s   reproductive   rights   by   giving   them   the   means   to  
make free and informed choices, and the ability to lower their fertility rates. The Cairo Plan of
Action has made this the stated goal of fertility and family-planning policies, and the international
community has been promoting this goal in developing countries since 1995. 175 Much less
attention has been given to the fact that even in developed countries there are cohesive
communities which deny women access to family planning for religious and ideological reasons,
resulting in inordinately high birth rates. One example of such a community is the ultra-Orthodox
Jewish community in Israel, whose average fertility rate is 6.5 children per woman.176 I will use
the example of the ultra-Orthodox community to discuss whether a state is allowed, or perhaps
even required, to try to find ways to ensure that women in the such communities are given full
knowledge and access to all methods of family planning to better control their own fertility. I will
170

Finkle & McIntosh, supra note 24, at 3-4.

171

Craig Lasher, U.S. Population Policy Since the Cairo Conference, ENVTL. CHANGE & SECURITY
PROJECT REP., Spring 1998, at 16, 16-17.
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See Peng, supra note 91, at 53. In 1979, the fertility rate in China was 2.8%, down from 5.8% in 1970.
This sharp decline was achieved through the implementation of a two child policy starting in 1973, but the Chinese
government felt that this decline was insufficient. Id. at 52-53.
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Savanyu, supra note 15, at 18-20.
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See Lasher, supra note 171, at 16.
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See id. at 21.
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argue that such a fertility policy will satisfy both prongs of the test suggested in this Article, since
the interest in securing for women full knowledge and access to family planning is a legitimate
interest in a democratic society that respects the individual rights of all those residing within it.
Moreover,  realizing  this  interest  would  promote  women’s  liberty  and  equality  rights.
It  is  well  established  that  “there  is  a  strong  correlation between high birth rates and the
scarcity of rights and opportunities for women, lack of representation for women, their exclusion
from   the   public   sphere,   and   higher   risks   for   the   health   of   both   women   and   children.” 177 In
addition, belonging to a large family might be detrimental to children, as very often large families
lack the means to provide their children with sufficient material and emotional resources
necessary for their proper development. 178 As I explained elsewhere:
The correlation between high fertility   rates   and   women’s   low   status   has   two  
interrelated explanations. Often the high number of children is not a result of a
woman’s  free  choice  but  the  result  of  societal  pressures  and  of  a  lack  of  access  
to family planning. Additionally, the need to give birth to, and take care of, a
large number of children makes it very difficult for a woman to develop herself,
and her independence and autonomy. Moreover, in patriarchal societies . . . such
as the ultra-Orthodox Jewish community in Israel, [compelling women to give]
birth to large numbers of children and dedicate their time to fulfilling [their]
children’s  needs,  serves  as  an  important  control  mechanism  meant  to  ensure  that  
women are too busy to revolt against their own subordination. 179
Ultra-Orthodox women are compelled to give birth through the control and manipulation
of meaning and knowledge, and not through the use of physical force. 180 There are three ways in
which this control is achieved: control over the creation of social meaning; control over
education; and control over access to outside sources of information. 181 This is a classic example
of  Foucault’s  insight,  mentioned  above,  that  ideology  allows  the  powerful  to  exercise  power  while  
at the same time masking it and legitimating its existence.182 First, the social and ideological
177
Stopler, supra note 28, at 11(citing Nancy E. Riley, Gender, Power, and Population Change,
POPULATION BULL., May 1997, at 2).
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See Sonalde Desai, When Are Children from Large Families Disadvantaged? Evidence from CrossNational Analyses, 49 POPULATION STUD. 195 (1995).
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Stopler, supra note 28, at 11-12 (footnote omitted). See Diana D.M. Babor, Population Growth and
Reproductive Rights in International Human Rights Law, 14 CONN. J. INT’L L. 83, 93-95 & nn.43, 48-49 (1999); Alice
Shalvi,  ‘Renew  Our  Days  as  of  Old’:  Religious  Fundamentalism  and  Social Change in the Modern Jewish State, in THE
FREEDOM TO DO GOD’S WILL: RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM AND SOCIAL CHANGE 75, 75-80 (Gerrie ter Haar & James J.
Busuttil eds., 2003); Ronit Ir-Shay, Family Planning: A Halakhic-Gender Perspective, 12 NASHIM 95, 96 (2006). Ir-Shay
provides as an example the response of one of the most influential rabbinic decisors (poskim) of contemporary ultraOrthodoxy,   Rabbi   Joshua   Neuwirth:   “According   to   [Neuwirth],   for   the   woman   to   place   her   own   wishes   before   the  
obligation to procreate,  even  if  having  children  is  merely  postponed,  is  equivalent  to  the  couple  ‘living  like  animals.’”  IrShay, supra, at 115.
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discourse which motivates the closed patriarchal community and determines the meaning of the
social reality within which the woman understands her life and her vocation is created exclusively
by its male leaders.183 Contemporary ultra-Orthodox Halachic rulings almost invariably present
constant pregnancies and large families as mandatory religious norms. 184 Thus, for example, the
male spiritual leaders of the community bestowed a rare honor on a mother of eighteen children
by defining  her  as  a  “righteous  woman”  because  of  her  high  number  of  children. 185 This is a clear
message to women in the community that giving birth to as many children as possible is the only
path to righteousness for a woman. The results of this hegemonic rabbinical discourse are
described by one of the rabbis who object to it as follows:
[T]here are families that are larger than their physical, mental, economic and
educational capacities allow and that are on the verge of disaster. The mother
can no longer keep herself going, they cannot take care of the children . . . and it
is a big blasphemy to think that the situation is mandated by the Halakhic norms
and that nothing can be done to change it.186
Second,  “the  main  objective  of  the  ultra-Orthodox  women’s  education system is to instill
in girls a complete identification with the oppressive social system to which she belongs, and to
her  subordinated  status  and  procreative  role  within  it.” 187 A good example of that is the credo of
the founder of the Beit-Ya’akov   College   for   Girls   in   Bnei   Brak,   who   explained   that   “[i]f   we  
succeed in instilling in our girl students that the purpose of their studies is to aspire to emulate our
matriarchs,   who   did   not   study,   then   we   have   succeeded   in   educating   our   daughters.” 188 The
socialization process of ultra-Orthodox women, which is focused on modesty, silence, and
obedience,189 makes it very hard for them to voice any objections to the religious and communal
dogma they are taught, or even to conceptualize such objections. 190
Proverbs such as   “The   daughter   of   the   king   is   all   dignified   within[]”   and   “A  
woman’s   voice   is   ervah (impure)”   in   their   orthodox   interpretations   restrict  
women to the private sphere, and enjoin them from having any voice in the
public sphere—both metaphorically and literally—and from participating in any
183

Stopler, supra at 28, at 13.

184

Id. (citing Ir-Shay, supra note 179).

185

Id.; Tamar Rotem, How Many Children Does It Take to Be Righteous, HAARETZ.COM, (Nov. 20, 2006,
12:00 AM), http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/features/how-many-children-does-it-take-to-be-righteous-1.205533. The
article  discusses  a  mother  of  eighteen  children  who  was  described  as  a  “righteous  woman”  for  having  so  many  children  by  
a rabbi mourning her premature death. See also Ir-Shay, supra note 179, at 112, 119.
186

Ronit Ir-Shay, “Be   Fertile   and   Increase   and   Fill   the   Earth”—Between Hegemonic Discourse to
Subversive Discourse in the Halakhic Rulings on Procreation, 31 OPINIONS 35, 37 (2007) (Hebrew).
187

Stopler, supra at 28, at 14; see TAMAR EL’OR, EDUCATED AND IGNORANT: ULTRAORTHODOX JEWISH
WOMEN AND THEIR WORLD 89 (Haim Watzman trans., 1994).
188

TAMAR EL’OR, supra note 187, at 65.

189

See Rachel   Elior,   “A Beautiful Woman with No Eyes,” in BLESSED THOUGH FOR MAKING ME A
WOMAN? THE WOMAN IN JUDAISM FROM THE BIBLE TO MODERN TIMES 37, 48-49 (D. Joel et al. eds., 1999) (Hebrew).
190

Stopler, supra note 28, at 15.
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form of policy setting or decision making. Any woman who defies these rules is
considered immodest, impure, and promiscuous. 191
Thirdly, another important means for achieving high fertility rates is the prohibition on
the use of contraception without prior rabbinical authorization. 192 Moreover, even when a woman
is given permission to use contraceptives, she is forbidden from discussing their use with her
friends, so as not to tempt other women to use them. 193
Just as the correlation  between  high  fertility  rates  and  women’s  low  status  is  clear,  so  too  
a   clear   correlation   has   been   found   between   advancing   women’s   status   and   decreasing   fertility.  
There is general agreement that the best way to decrease fertility within populations in which
fertility is too high is by empowering women, strengthening their social status, and enabling them
to resist the dictates of traditional communities which demand that they give birth to large
numbers of children.194 Nevertheless, two interrelated objections can be raised against allowing
the state to take any steps to decrease fertility rates in traditional communities. One is the liberal
objection, a variant of which was already discussed at some length and rejected, which precludes
state involvement in the private sphere and especially in procreation decisions. 195 The liberal
objector would posit that community, just like family, is part of the private sphere and that
therefore the state has no business intervening in it. Such intervention infringes on the individual
right to privacy, freedom of association, and freedom of religion. 196 As already discussed, from a
feminist perspective, intervention in the private sphere, including in procreation decisions, is
sometimes  necessary  to  protect  women’s  rights,  since  much  of  women’s  subordination  occurs  in  
the private sphere and involves control over procreation. 197 Because in these cases freedom of
association and freedom of religion are used to subordinate women by controlling and exploiting
their procreative powers,  the   state   has  a  legitimate   interest   to  intervene  to  both  ensure   women’s  
knowledge and access to family planning, and to prevent their exploitation.
A related objection would posit that by taking such measures, the state infringes on the
community’s  right to culture, threatening its unique values and ways of life. In recent years, rights
and identity claims of cultural communities have come to the forefront of the social and political
discourse and of the discourse of rights. 198 The dilemmas that arise from the need to combine the
liberal  state’s  commitment  to  universality,  equality,  and  neutrality  between  various  conceptions  of  
the  good,  with  traditional  communities’  demand  to  preserve  their  unique  ways  of  life,  boundaries,  
and culture, are at the heart of the multicultural discourse.199 Advocates of multiculturalism posit
191

Stopler, supra note 28, at 15 (footnotes omitted); see Elior, supra note 189, at 43-44, 48-50.

192

Stopler, supra note 28, at 14.

193

Id. (citing The Prevention of Pregnancy, in 6 HALACHIC MEDICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA (Avraham Steinberg
ed., Jerusalem 1996), available at http://www.daat.ac.il/daat/refua/encyc/menia.htm; Ir-Shay, supra note179, at 119).
194

See Babor, supra note 179, at 93-94 & nn.43, 48-49.

195

See supra Part I.A.

196

See Chandran Kukathas, Are There Any Cultural Rights?, 20 POL. THEORY 105 (1992) (discussing
liberal arguments against intervention in traditional communities).
197

See supra Part I.C.

198

See SEYLA BENHABIB, THE CLAIMS OF CULTURE: EQUALITY AND DIVERSITY IN THE GLOBAL ERA, at

viii (2002).
199

See generally id.; WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY
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that the community to which a person belongs, with its specific culture, language and practices,
provides the necessary context within which she can develop and exercise her autonomous
capacity to choose her values and her way of life. 200 Alternatively, it provides the necessary
context within which her identity is formed and within which she understands herself. 201
Consequently, it is argued that the preservation of the community can justify according
preferential treatment to communities that will allow them to preserve their cultures, and may
even  justify  permitting  communities  to  restrict  some  of  their  members’  rights,  though  not  the  most  
fundamental ones.202
Following this line of thinking, the leaders of the ultra-Orthodox community could claim
that not only should the state refrain from interfering with the ultra-Orthodox procreation
practices, but also that the state should actively support these practices as they are an essential
component of their culture and should therefore be preserved and supported. I would posit that
although the right to culture is an important right that must be respected, the argument for the
preservation of culture can justify neither support for, nor noninterference with, the inordinately
high fertility rates in the ultra-Orthodox community and the manner in which they are achieved.
The  preservation  of  a  culture  is  not  an  interest  that  can  justify  the  grievous  violation  of  women’s  
fundamental rights to equality, autonomy, and bodily integrity that occurs as a result of the
procreative practices of the ultra-Orthodox community. Demands for cultural accommodation
should  only  be  met  if  they  promote  what  Professor  Nancy  Fraser  terms  “parity  of  participation,”  
both within the group and between groups, i.e., if they promote the ability of all adult members of
the   society  to  interact   with  one   another  as  peers  by  ensuring  their  independence  and   “voice”  on  
the physical, as well as on the symbolic level.203 The ultra-Orthodox procreation practices have
the exact opposite effect on women.
Another reason to not accommodate ultra-Orthodox procreation practices is that, in fact,
the high fertility rates of the ultra-Orthodox are not an age-old cultural practice, but a relatively
new phenomenon resulting from a combination of religious indoctrination with the structure of
child allowances in Israel favoring families with four children or more. 204 Thus, the current
fertility rates of the ultra-Orthodox community are not an age-old practice that has formed the
backbone of communal existence for generations; its preservation is therefore not essential to the
RIGHTS (1995); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983); CHARLES
TAYLOR ET AL., MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994).
200

See, e.g., KYMLICKA, supra note 199, at 126.

201

See TAYLOR ET AL., supra note 199, at 61, 63-65.

202

Id. at 59, 61; KYMLICKA, supra note 199, at 126, 152, 164-70. Although Kymlicka distinguishes
between  a  community’s  right  for  external  protections,  which  he  supports,  and  its  right  to  place  internal  restrictions  on  its  
members, which he rejects, he nevertheless would not intervene in internal cultural practices that violate human rights
unless these practices constitute systematic and grave violations of rights such as slavery, genocide, or torture. See
KYMLICKA, supra note 199, at 126, 152, 164-70.
203

Nancy Fraser & Alex Honneth, REDISTRIBUTION OR RECOGNITION?: A POLITICAL-PHILOSOPHICAL
EXCHANGE 36-41 (Joel Golb, James Ingram & Christiane Wilke trans., 2003); see also Chaim Gans, Individuals’  Interest  
in the Preservation of Their Culture, 1 L. & ETHICS HUMAN RTS. 6, 16 (2007) (positing that measures for cultural
preservation are only legitimate as long as they do not significantly violate the human rights and freedoms of both
members and non-members of groups.); Stopler, supra note 28, at 33 n.98.
IN ISRAEL,

204
MORIA AVNIMELECH & YOSSI TAMIR, A SOCIAL TIME BOMB: ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF WELFARE
81-82, 86-88 (2002) (Hebrew).
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continued existence of the community. Consequently, I would argue that Israel should educate
ultra-Orthodox girls and women, disseminate information to them, and guarantee free access to
family-planning services in order to allow them to gain more control over their procreative
practices.
IV. EUGENIC FERTILITY POLICIES
A. Types of Eugenic Fertility Policies
Unlike pronatalist and antinatalist fertility policies that focus on fertility as a means for
increasing or decreasing the size of the population, eugenic fertility policies focus on control over
fertility as a means for improving the quality of the population. Sir Francis Galton has defined
eugenics   as   “the   science   which   deals   with   all   influences   that   improve   the   inborn   qualities   of   a  
race . . .   [and]   develop   them   to   the   utmost   advantage.” 205 Because eugenic fertility policies
rationalize disparate treatment of different population groups according to their alleged aptitude,
they justify the imposition of disparate fertility policies on disempowered minorities on an
allegedly  scientific  basis,  and  bring  to  the  forefront  the  inextricable  links  between  women’s  rights  
and the rights of other disempowered minorities. The eugenic approach to fertility had gained
popularity at the close of the nineteenth century. Thus, in 1907, United States President Theodore
Roosevelt had warned that the upper-class   white   women’s   tendency   to   have   small   families
constituted   “race   suicide”   because   it   resulted   in   “a   tendency   to   the   elimination   instead   of   the  
survival   of   the   fittest.”206 A   similar   concern   for   the   quality   of   the   “British   stock”   was   raised   in  
Britain due to the high fertility rates among the lower class and the decreasing fertility rates
among the middle and upper classes. 207 On the basis of eugenic principles, in 1927 the United
States Supreme Court approved the forced sterilization of the mentally challenged, reasoning that
sterilization was necessary in  order  to  avoid  a  world  “swamped  with  incompetence.” 208 In Justice
Holmes’s   infamous   words:   “Three   generations   of   imbeciles   are   enough.” 209 This decision has
never been overturned, and it was not until 1974 that the federal government banned sterilization
without consent in hospitals that receive federal funds. 210 The eugenic approach also served to
justify anti-miscegenation laws in the United States,211 and immigration policies that gave priority
205

Francis Galton, Eugenics: Its Definition, Scope, and Aims, 10 AM. J. SOC. 1 (1904).

206

Dennis Hodgson & Susan Cotts Watkins, Feminists and Neo-Malthusians: Past and Present Alliances,
23 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 469, 473 (1997) (quoting Theodore Roosevelt) (internal quotation marks omitted).
207

Francesca Klug, ‘Oh  to  Be  in  England’:  The  British  Case  Study, in WOMAN—NATION—STATE 16, 21
(Nira Yuval-Davis & Floya Anthias eds., 1989).
208

Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). Justice Holmes further reasoned that it is better to prevent those
who are clearly incompetent from having children than to have to kill those children because of crimes they will commit
or to watch them starve in the streets due to their lack of competence. Id.
209

Id.

210

Powell, supra note 15, at 484.

211

On eugenics as the basis for anti-miscegenation laws, see Paul Lombardo, Eugenic Laws against Race
Mixing, IMAGE ARCHIVE ON AM. EUGENICS MOVEMENT, http://www.eugenicsarchive.org/html/eugenics/essay7text.html
(last visited Mar. 28, 2015). An example of such a law is the Virginia Racial Integrity Act of 1924, which forbade
marriage between a white person and any person who had a trace of non-white blood in order to prevent watering down of
the white race. Virginia Racial Integrity Act of 1924, ch. 371, 1924 Va. Acts 534 (repealed 1975).
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to Anglo-Saxon immigrants to the United States and Britain. 212 After eugenic principles formed
the basis for Nazi Aryan race theory and served as an impetus for mass exterminations during the
Second World War, eugenics has fallen into disrepute. 213 Nevertheless, it continued to serve as the
covert basis for population policies in various countries.214 One example of an implicitly eugenic
fertility policy in the United States is the family cap for welfare recipients, which is aimed at
discouraging childbirth among welfare recipients by failing to increase benefits when an
additional child is born while a parent is receiving income support.215 This program targets mostly
poor African-American women.216
B. Restrictions on Interracial and Interreligious Marriages as Eugenic Fertility Policies
In   addition   to   controlling   women’s   fertility rates, states and communities control
women’s  reproductive   capacity  by  controlling   whom  they   can   marry,  in   what   may  be   seen  as  a  
eugenic attempt to maintain the purity of racial or religious communities and their boundaries. 217
For example, during Apartheid, South African law prevented women from becoming sexually
involved with men from different racial groups than their own. 218 In the United States, antimiscegenation state laws that criminalized interracial marriage were only struck down by the
Supreme Court in 1967, when it held in Loving v. Virginia that such laws were
unconstitutional.219 The act that served as the basis for the statutory scheme under which the
Lovings were convicted was the Virginia Racial Integrity Act of 1924, which forbade marriage
between a white person and any person who had a trace of non-white blood, in order to prevent
watering down of the white race.220 Accordingly,  section  5  of  the  Act  stated  that  “the  term  ‘white  
person’   shall   apply   only   to   the   person   who   has   no   trace   whatsoever   of any blood other than
Caucasian.”221 The trial judge who convicted the Lovings reasoned that:

212

On British immigration policy and its relation to eugenics, see Klug, supra note 207, at 25.

On U.S. immigration policy and its relation to eugenics, see Paul Lombardo, Eugenics Laws Restricting Immigration,
IMAGE ARCHIVE ON AM. EUGENICS MOVEMENT, http://www.eugenicsarchive.org/html/eugenics/essay9text.html (last
visited Mar. 28, 2015).
213

See Hodgson & Cotts Watkins, supra note 206, at 478.

214

See, e.g., Jana Grekul, Harvey Krahn & Dave Odynak, Sterilizing   the   “Feeble-minded”:   Eugenics   in  
Alberta, Canada, 1929-1972, 17 J. HIST. SOC. 358 (2004) (discussing sterilization of the feeble minded that continued in
Canada until 1972); Klug, supra note 207, at 26 (regarding an immigration policy guided by eugenic principles in Britain).
215

See Powell, supra note 15, at 490-91; see also Rebekah J. Smith, Family Caps in Welfare Reform: Their
Coercive Effects and Damaging Consequences, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 151 (2006).
216

See Powell, supra note 15, at 490; see also JILL ELAINE HASDAY, FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED 210-14

217

Stopler, supra note 93, at 170.

218

Id. (citing Anthias & Yuval-Davis, supra note 98, at 9).

219

Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967).

220

Id. at 6-7; Virginia Racial Integrity Act of 1924, ch. 371, 1924 Va. Acts 534 (repealed 1975).

221

Virginia Racial Integrity Act of 1924, ch. 371, § 5, 1924 Va. Acts 534,535 (repealed 1975).
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Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he
placed them on separate continents. And, but for the interference with his
arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages. The fact that he
separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix. 222
Anti-miscegenation laws constituted fertility policies because preventing the birth of
children  of  “mixed”  race   was  a  central purpose of these laws.223 There can be no doubt that the
desire of a state to maintain racial purity is a clearly illegitimate interest. A tougher question
arises with regard to laws that restrict interreligious marriages for the purpose of preserving the
boundaries of religious communities, as is the case in Israel. Interreligious marriages are not
prohibited under Israeli law. However, because Israeli law recognizes only religious marriages
conducted by religious tribunals of recognized religious communities, people of different
religions cannot marry each other in Israel. 224 Thus, Israel has transformed religious prohibitions
that   aim   “to   protect   the   boundaries   of   the   various   religious   communities   by   prohibiting  
[religiously mixed] marriages . . . into compulsory state laws that apply to all, regardless of their
religious   convictions.”225 A desire to maintain the boundaries of the Jewish community, and
especially  to  prevent  the  loss  of  Jews  to  other  religions,  has  played  a  major  role  in  the  legislature’s  
decision to adopt this statutory scheme.
When introducing the Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce)
Act in 1953[,] the Deputy Minister for Religious Affairs explained that one of
the purposes of granting legal recognition exclusively to religious marriages
was to exclude the possibility of mixed marriages that might result in the
conversion of Jews to other [religions]. Similarly, when it became known that
the Muslim Sharia court[] . . . [is] willing to marry Muslim men to Jewish
women, the Ministry for Religious Affairs instructed the Sharia courts to refrain
from conducting such marriages.226
Can a distinction be made between a statutory scheme that prevents interracial marriages,
such as the historic anti-miscegenation laws in the United States, and a statutory scheme that
222

Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. at 3 (quoting trial judge) (internal quotation marks omitted).

223

An additional purpose of such laws was to prevent black men who were deemed inferior and animalistic
from having sexual relations with idealized pure white women. See DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, WOMEN, GAYS, AND THE
CONSTITUTION: THE GROUNDS FOR FEMINISM AND GAY RIGHTS IN CULTURE AND LAW 222 (1998).
224

Stopler, supra note 93, at 170; see British Order in Council Making Provision for the Administration of
the Mandated Territory of Palestine, Aug. 10. 1922, 116 B.S.P. 204, 215 (1922); Rabbinical Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage
and Divorce) Law, 5713-1953, 7 LSI 139 (1952-1953) (Isr.).
225

Stopler, supra note 93, at 170.

226

Stopler, supra note 93, at 170 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted); see Zvi H. Triger, There is a State
for Love: Marriage and Divorce between Jews in Israel, in TRIALS OF LOVE 173, 204 (Orna Ben-Naftali and Hannah
Naveh eds., 2005) (Hebrew); PINHAS SHIFFMAN, CIVIL OR SACRED: MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ALTERNATIVES IN
ISRAEL—A NECESSARY AND FEASIBLE CHANGE 12 (2001) (Hebrew), available at http://www.acri.org.il/he/wpcontent/uploads/2011/07/kadat-o-kadin.pdf.  “It  is  interesting  to  note  that  although  according  to  Islam  the  Sharia  courts  can  
marry Muslim men to non-Muslim women, they cannot marry Muslim women to non-Muslim men, most probably
because  of  the  assumption  that  the  woman  will  eventually  convert  to  the  man’s  religion,  and  thus  become  non-Muslim.”  
Stopler, supra note 93, at 177 n.20.
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prevents inter-religious marriages, such as the Israeli marriage laws? One clear distinction
between the two schemes is the degree of coercion that is involved. While the American scheme
criminalized interracial marriages, the Israeli scheme merely prevents interreligious marriages
within state borders, while recognizing interreligious marriages that have been conducted legally
in a foreign country. Another important distinction that might be offered pertains to the
motivations underlying the two schemes. One could argue that there is a substantial difference
between a scheme that prevents interracial marriages due to the belief that the white race is
superior and should therefore not interbreed with the black race, and one that prevents
interreligious marriages in order to preserve communities and prevent their extinction. While the
former is motivated by sheer racism, the latter can presumably be justified using communitarian
and multicultural arguments.227 Such arguments are often found compelling in the arena of family
law  since  “[f]amily  law  in  particular  is  regarded  as  having  a  crucial  role  in  the  preservation  of  the  
community and the demarcation of its borders, and it has even been argued that the function of
family law vis-à-vis the community is parallel to the function of citizenship law vis-à-vis the
sovereign   state.”228 Consequently, one could argue that the need of the various religious
communities in Israel to preserve and demarcate their boundaries constitutes a legitimate interest
that justifies a legal scheme that recognizes only religious marriages between community
members.229 I disagree. Protecting the boundaries of religious communities through restrictions on
intermarriage may be a legitimate interest for communities themselves, who may try to achieve it
through private means such as teaching and persuasion. However, protecting religious
communities through restrictions on marriages cannot be considered a legitimate interest for a
state that must remain neutral with respect  to  its  citizens’  religious  affiliation  and  may  not  allocate  
or deny rights according to religious affiliation. 230
Thus,  Israel’s  restrictions  on  interreligious   marriages  do  not  meet  the  first  prong  of  the  
test suggested in this Article—the legitimate interest prong. Furthermore, they do not meet the
second prong of the test—the liberty and equality prong. The preservation of community
boundaries in this manner results in serious violations of the rights of individuals within and
outside the communities: women’s   right   to   equality   which   is   violated   by   the   imposition   of  
patriarchal   and   discriminatory   religious   laws;;   individuals’   right   to   family   life   which   is   denied  
because   religious   restrictions   prevent   them   from   marrying   each   other;;   and   individuals’   right   to
freedom of conscience and freedom from religion which is violated by the imposition of religious
laws on people who are not religious. 231 Thus, if, as already argued, measures for cultural

227

See discussion of such arguments in Part IV.B of this Article.

228

Stopler, supra note 93, 176 n.10 (citing AYELET SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS:
CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS 45-47 (2001)).
229

Thus, for example, the former Chief Justice of the Israeli Supreme Court, Aharon Barak, has expressed
the opinion that the limitation of marriages of Jewish Israelis to religious marriages held before the rabbinical courts can
be  justified  on  the  basis  of  Israel’s  character  as  a  Jewish  and  democratic  state.  Ruth  Gavison,   A Jewish and Democratic
State: Challenges and Risks, in MULTICULTURALISM IN A DEMOCRATIC AND JEWISH STATE 213, 273-74 (Menahem
Mautner, Avi Sagi, & Ronen Shamir, eds., 1998) (Hebrew).
230
See STEPHEN V. MONSMA & J. CHRISTOPHER SOPER, THE CHALLENGE OF PLURALISM: CHURCH AND
STATE IN FIVE DEMOCRACIES 6-10 (2d ed. 2009); see generally CHURCH AND STATE IN CONTEMPORARY EUROPE: THE
CHIMERA OF NEUTRALITY (John T. S. Madeley & Zsolt Enyedi eds., 2003) (discussing church-state relations in
contemporary Europe).
231

See SHIFFMAN, supra note 226, at 5-9.
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preservation are only legitimate as long as they promote parity of participation, or at least as long
as they do not significantly violate the human rights and freedoms of both members and nonmembers of groups, 232 then a statutory scheme allowing only for religious marriages within
recognized religious communities is illegitimate and must be altered.
Furthermore, one must not forget that the preservation of culture and community
argument may serve as a pretext for racism. For example, while many countries in Europe claim
that their recent immigration and naturalization restrictions are the result of the need to preserve
their national cultures, some regard these restrictions as manifestations of covert racism. 233 Others
see additional support for this view in the fact that at the same time that these countries restrict
immigration,   they   enact   proactive   fertility   policies   aimed   at   increasing   the   local   population’s  
under-replacement fertility rates.234 Similarly, the strict preservation of community boundaries
through religious marriages often stems from racism and from the belief that  one’s  religion  and  
co-religionists   are   chosen   and   superior   to   others.   The   Israeli   Ministry   for   Religious   Affairs’s  
instruction to the Sharia courts not to marry Muslim men to Jewish women may suggest such a
line of thinking.235
V. CONCLUSION
The liberal assumption that governments must not set fertility policies is flawed in both
theory and practice. It is flawed in practice because whether intentionally or not, and whether they
admit to it or not, governments set policies that directly and indirectly affect fertility. It is flawed
in  theory  because  the  government  must  take  reproduction  into  account  in  order  to  ensure  women’s  
rights to liberty and equality. Thus, when a government does not fund abortion and does not
guarantee free and easy access to it, the government prevents low-income women from obtaining
abortions, and condemns them to a life of hardship and misery. When a government does not
guarantee paid maternity leave, it makes it impossible for women to compete in the job market on
an equal footing with men. When a government refuses to intervene in the private sphere to
ensure that women in traditional communities have full information on and access to family
planning, it allows for their continued exploitation by their community. At the same time, past and
present experience has taught us that fertility policies initiated by states and communities to
respond to their population needs have, more often than not, ignored the rights of the women
recruited to carry them through, and have used women as a means to an end, rather than as an end
in themselves.
Consequently,  while  Foucault’s  aversion  to  biopolitics  is  understandable,  those  who  are  
concerned   with   women’s   rights   to   liberty   and   equality   have   no   choice   but   to   acknowledge   that  
biopolitics occurs all around us, and to try to offer ways in which it can be harnessed to advance
women’s   rights   rather   than   to   exploit   women.   This   Article   has   attempted   to   do   just   that   by  
suggesting a test for assessing the legitimacy of fertility policies. It has identified three types of
interests that fertility policies may serve: legitimate state and group interests; individual liberty
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interests, such as autonomy and privacy; and individual equality interests.
The validity of a given fertility policy should be assessed by examining it against these
interests, and two rules should guide this examination. First, similar to any other government
policy,  fertility  policies  should  only  be  based  on  a  state’s  need  to  promote  legitimate  interests  (the  
“legitimate   interests   prong”).   Second,   due   to   the   primacy   of   individual   rights,   even   legitimate  
state and group interests in fertility can only be realized while respecting and promoting
individual  rights,  especially  individual   women’s  rights,  to  both  liberty  and  equality  (the  “liberty
and  equality  prong”).  Any  policy  should  satisfy  both  prongs  of  the  test  concurrently  in  order  to  be  
considered legitimate. Fertility policies are here to stay, and they hold both a threat and a promise.
It is our task to demand their transparency and to carefully scrutinize them in order to ensure that
they are used to promote, rather than to obstruct, rights.
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